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Abstract
This paper exploits a dispersal policy for refugee immigrants to
estimate the importance of local and regional factors for refugees’ lo-
cation preferences.
The main results of a mixed proportional hazard competing risks
model are that placed refugees react to high regional unemployment
and lack of a local immigrant population by migrating to large mu-
nicipalities. Lack of local fellow countrymen, however, increases the
exit rate to medium-sized as well as large municipalities. This ﬁnding
is likely to be a result of the dispersal policy. Finally, refugees react
strongly to assignment to small municipalities by migrating mainly to
medium-sized municipalities.
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11 Introduction
It is a common international phenomenon that the immigrant population is
geographically clustered. In 1990, 63% of the foreign born population in the
US were clustered in the four most populous states, California, New York,
Florida and Texas, where only 31% of the overall population lived (Zavodny
1997). In 1997, 53% of the Swedish immigrant population lived in one of the
three largest cities, although only 35% of the native population lived in these
cities (Åslund 2001). Similarly in 1998, 52% of the foreign born population
in Denmark lived in the metropolitan area, while only 34% of the overall
population lived there (Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs 1999).
In the policy discussion, critics blame residential concentration and seg-
regation of immigrants for hampering the integration process of immigrants
by slowing down the acquisition of country-speciﬁc human capital, such as
language skills and knowledge about the host country (Åslund 2001). In
addition, cities receiving a large proportion of the immigrant inﬂow often
consider this a ﬁnancial and social burden since new immigrants tend to
have a low labour market attachment. For these reasons, policies aﬀecting
the location of refugees are carried out in the US, Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway and Denmark. Such policies are called dispersal policies, settlement
policies or placement policies. Also the UK has recently implemented a new
system where refugee immigrants are located away from the London region
and Southeast England where most previous refugees stay. Sweden, however,
partly abandoned its dispersal policy, the ”Whole of Sweden Strategy”, in
1994.1
Those criticizing dispersal policies claimthat not allowing people to choose
for themselves will lead to higher subsequent migration rates, i.e. refugees
will relocate after initial placement within the host country, which will undo
some of the intended results of the policy. Empirical studies on dispersal
policies in the US (Forbes 1985), Norway (Djuve and Kavli 2000), Sweden
(Åslund 2001) and Denmark (Hummelgaard et al. 1995) all conﬁrm that the
secondary migration rates are high. For example, 45% of the 1975 arrivals to
the US from Indochina lived in a diﬀerent state in 1980 than they did upon
placement (Forbes 1985). Similarly, 38% of the refugee immigrants who were
placed according to the Whole of Sweden Strategy during 1987-1989 had re-
1Since 1994, the Swedish authorities have placed only about 50% of new refugee immi-
grants in Sweden.
2located to another municipality within four years after the initial settlement
(Åslund 2001). Concerning the choice of destination, these studies suggest
that secondary migration occurs towards larger cities with members of the
same ethnic group. This is in line with empirical US studies which consis-
tently ﬁnd that new immigrants tend to settle in the large cities where other
ethnic minorities live (Bartel 1989, Zavodny 1997, Borjas 1999, Jaeger 2000,
Bauer et al. 2002).
Migration theory predicts that there may be other determinants of immi-
grants’ location decision than presence of country fellowmen and other im-
migrant groups, including economic factors such as regional unemployment,
social beneﬁt levels or eligibility rules or public goods provision if interre-
gional diﬀerences exist. US studies have found contrasting evidence on this
issue. Immigrants are found to be insensitive to local labour market con-
ditions in Bartel (1989) whereas Jaeger (2000) ﬁnds that all visa categories
of immigrants, except spouses of US citizens, are indeed sensitive to these
conditions. Zavodny (1998) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant evidence of welfare seeking
inﬂuencing immigrants’ settlement decision, while Borjas (1999) does.
Little research exists on the location choice of immigrants outside the
US. The empirical study by Åslund (2001) on the initial and subsequent
location of immigrants to Sweden during the 1980s is an important exception.
Empirical ﬁndings of that study show that refugee immigrants are attracted
to regions in which co-nationals and other immigrants live and tend to leave
locations with high overall unemployment and move to municipalities with
high immigrant employment rates and high average earnings. On the other
hand, Åslund ﬁnds no evidence of direct welfare seeking.
Moreover, previous empirical micro-level studies on immigrants’ location
preferences (e.g. Bartel 1989, Jaeger 2000, Åslund 2001) have typically used
a multinomial logit framework following McFadden (1973) to estimate pull
factors, i.e. the set of negative and positive social or economic factors in
potential areas of destination which pulls migrants towards them (Lee 1966).
However, for dispersal policy purposes, investigation of push factors, i.e. the
set of negative and positive social and economic factors in the area of origin
which pushes migrants away (Lee 1966), is equally important. Little econo-
metric evidence exists on push factors for placed refugees. The study by
Hummelgaard et al. (1995) provides some evidence, though. Estimation re-
sults from a discrete choice model for refugees’ (placed as well as non-placed)
cross-municipal relocation in Denmark showed relatively high subsequent mi-
gration rates out of municipalities with a low share of fellow countrymen, a
3low overall share of immigrants and few rental ﬂats, controlling for a rich set
of personal attributes. However, the focus of the empirical analysis was in
fact the importance of personal attributes rather than of location character-
istics for the relocation decision.
With better knowledge of pull and especially push factors inﬂuencing
settlement patterns and migration decisions of refugees, future attempts to
inﬂuence the settlement pattern of new refugee immigrants could be more
successful both in achieving the governmental objective of a geographically
dispersed settlement of refugee immigrants and in increasing the utility of
individual refugees. Second, such knowledge will aid in predicting which
locations can expect placed refugees to stay and which locations can expect
to receive refugee immigrants in the future.
The objective of the present study is to estimate push factors for refugees
subject to a dispersal policy. In general, unbiased estimation of the eﬀects of
potential push factors in migration decisions requires that location sorting is
taken into account, which is present if location characteristics of the area of
origin are correlated with unobserved characteristics of the individual that
also inﬂuence the migration decision. This is likely to be the case, because in
general individuals choose location of residence themselves, in a non-random
way, based on a number of observed and unobserved determinants of migra-
tion. To give an example, location sorting of new immigrants is likely to take
place in the following way: New immigrants who are not proﬁcient in foreign
languages settle in the existing enclaves of fellow countrymen in the host-
country while new immigrants who are proﬁcient in the foreign languages
settle outside these enclaves. Foreign language proﬁciency of new immi-
grants is usually unobserved to the researcher. Under these circumstances,
estimation of push factors based on immigrants’ subsequent migration pat-
tern gives rise to biased estimates to the extent that the migration decision
is inﬂuenced by foreign language proﬁciency.
The present study circumvents the location sorting problem by estimating
push factors for refugees subject to the Danish dispersal policy 1986-1998,
which implied that new refugees were randomly distributed across locations
in Denmark conditional on six refugee characteristics largely observable in
Danish administrative registers for the population of refugee immigrants.
Controlling for these refugee characteristics in the migration decision, the
initial location can be regarded as exogenous in the subsequent migration
decision. In this way the Danish dispersal policy can be regarded as a nat-
ural experiment. This paper takes advantage of the natural experiment to
4estimate eﬀects of location characteristics on placed refugees’ migration deci-
sions, which are not aﬀected by initial location sorting. In contrast, estimated
eﬀects of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the individual on
the migration decision are correlations. Hence, they should not be given a
causal interpretation.
The data constitute another strength of the present study. The study uses
micro data for the population of refugees which stem from a rich longitudinal
administrative register data set for the immigrant population in Denmark
available from 1984 until 2001 from Statistics Denmark. The macro level
data source is time-series data for municipality characteristics, also from
Statistics Denmark.
Most importantly, the micro data allows for reconstruction of the residen-
tial history of a refugee immigrant. However, the location preference analysis
is restricted to the ﬁrst migration investment because of the exogeneity of the
initial location in contrast to the endogeneity of subsequent locations. The
main geographical unit of location used in the study is a municipality, be-
cause the Danish dispersal policy aimed at an equal distribution of refugees,
not only at the county level, but also at the municipality level. Hence, a
move across the municipality border is regarded as a migration investment.
However, for completeness I also present descriptive evidence on refugees’
settlement and subsequent migration using the county as the geographical
unit of location.
The main results from this study are as follows. First, placed refugees
react to high regional unemployment by migrating to large municipalities,
thereby increasing the existing concentration of immigrants there. Second,
lack of an ethnic network is another important push factor; however, inter-
estingly refugees are found to be only slightly more likely to migrate to large
rather than medium-sized municipalities in search for fellow countrymen.
This ﬁnding is understandable in view of the Dispersal Policy under which
the larger refugee groups tended to be dispersed in big clusters of the same
ethnic origin across counties and within these counties mainly across medium-
sized municipalities. Third, lack of an immigrant network pushes refugees
to large municipalities. Fourth, refugees react very strongly to placement
in small municipalities mainly by migrating to medium-sized municipalities,
possibly due to step-migration. Fifth, being employed the previous year is
associated with a considerably higher probability of migration to a small or
medium-sized municipality and a substantially lower probability of migration
to a large municipality. Finally, the more years of Danish education the lower
5is the probability of men migrating to medium-sized municipalities.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section brieﬂy describes
the Danish dispersal policy carried out from 1986 to 1998. Section 3 brieﬂy
reviews general theories of migration and ﬁndings of previous empirical stud-
ies on immigrants’ location preferences. These reviews are the foundation of
the hypotheses presented at the end of Section 3. The theoretical model and
its econometric speciﬁcation are presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes
the data and presents descriptive evidence on placed refugees’ subsequent mi-
gration pattern. The estimation results are reported and discussed in Section
6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Danish Dispersal Policy 1986-1998
In the 1980s the majority of refugees granted asylum in Denmark wanted to
settle in the metropolitan area or in one of the larger towns. The Danish
Refugee Council (Dansk Flygtningehjælp), henceforth DRC, was responsible
for helping new refugee immigrants search for permanent housing. However,
in 1984 the number of refugees granted asylum in Denmark was relatively
high. Therefore, DRC was no longer able to provide all refugees with housing
in one of their preferred cities. Instead, DRC started providing some refugees
with housing in medium-sized towns. As the number of refugees granted asy-
lum continued to rise in 1985-1986, it became increasingly diﬃcult to ﬁnd
permanent housing for refugees in the typically preferred cities, which led the
government and politicians in general to urge DRC to disperse refugees over
all 14 Danish counties and Frederiksberg and Copenhagen county municipal-
ities. DRC reformed its dispersal policy according to the political wishes.
1986 marks the start of the ﬁrst Danish dispersal policy which was in
force until 1999 and was carried out by DRC. In 1986, 182 out of a total of
275 municipalities in Denmark received refugees who during an introductory
period of 18 months participated in Danish language courses while receiving
social beneﬁts.2
After the reform in 1986, all refugees, apart from reuniﬁcation immi-
grants, were subjected to the dispersal policy unless they could ﬁnd a place
2In 1999, a stricter settlement policy came into force which aimed at promoting bet-
ter integration of refugees by means of further geographical dispersal and an extended
introduction programme supplied by the municipalities hosting the refugees (law no. 474
passed the 1st of July 1998).
6of living themselves. During the period 1986-1994, approximately 91% of
the refugees were provided with or assisted in ﬁnding permanent housing by
DRC under the terms of the dispersal policy (Annual Reports of DRC 1986-
95). Internal administrative statistics of DRC for 1995-1998 indicate that
from 1995 to 1997 approximately 89 % of new refugees were provided with
permanent housing by DRC or - as a new feature of the dispersal policy - by
a local government if it had wished to take over the responsibility for new
refugees in the municipality from DRC.
DRC’s assignment policy aimed at promoting an equal distribution of
refugees in proportion to the population in each county. At the county level,
DRC aimed at the attainment of an equal distribution of refugees over a num-
ber of years among those municipalities, which had the necessary facilities
for integration such as dwellings, educational institutions and employment
opportunities and in which refugees had the opportunity of socializing with
compatriots. When deciding to which county a refugee should be assigned,
location wishes of the refugee, if any, should be taken into account. In prac-
tice, these dispersal criteria implied that new refugees were provided with
permanent housing in the metropolitan area, larger cities and medium-sized
towns and to a lesser extent rural districts (Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs 1996).
The refugees were urged to stay in the assigned municipality during an
entire introductory period of 18 months in which they participated in Danish
language courses while receiving means-tested social beneﬁts. However, there
were no restrictions against relocating. Refugees could move away from their
initial municipality any time, in so far as they could ﬁnd housing elsewhere on
their own. In addition to moving costs, such a relocation involved potential
costs in form of having to wait before being admitted into a new language
course and, in case of small children, waiting for their admittance into a new
kindergarten. Receipt of means-tested social welfare was not conditional on
residing in the assigned municipality.
In 1995, Denmark granted asylumto an unusually large number of refugees
due to large inﬂows of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to acute hous-
ing problems and the temporary character of the permit to stay, a special
introduction programme was developed for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina
(see Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs 1995). Contrary to the dispersal policy under
the ordinary introduction programme, the special introduction programme
included settlement in rural districts, thereby ignoring whether a municipal-
ity had suitable characteristics for reception or not. Instead, the availability
of housing became the decisive factor.
7Empirical evidence shows that the dispersal policy did, at least in the
short run, inﬂuence the location patterns of refugees. By 1993, 71% of the
non-western immigrants other than refugees lived in the metropolitan area
whereas only 33% of refugee immigrants lived here. 24% of non-western
immigrants other than refugees lived in towns outside the metropolitan area
whereas the majority of refugee immigrants, 56%, lived here. Finally, only
5% of the non-western immigrants lived in rural districts against almost 12%
of the refugee immigrants (Danish Refugee Council 1993).
The actual implementation of the dispersal policy was investigated in
Damm (2003) to examine whether some refugees were more likely to realise
their preferred settlement option than others. The analysis was carried out
by interviewing two placement oﬃcers at DRC, by examining DRC’s inter-
nal administrative statistics and by establishing descriptive and econometric
evidence on the initial settlement of placed refugees based on the census
of refugee immigrants from administrative registers. The study concluded
that actual settlement may have been inﬂuenced by a person’s characteris-
tics with regard to family status (single or family), health (in need of special
medical or psychological treatment), special educational needs, the location
of close family and friends, nationality (due to dispersal in ethnic clusters) as
well as year of immigration (it became increasingly diﬃcult for DRC to ﬁnd
housing in larger and medium-sized towns). These governing factors suggest
that a refugee with family and in need of special treatment or education,
and refugees with close family in Denmark near whom they were determined
to live and who arrived early in the observation period were most likely to
realise their preferred settlement option.
3 Migration theory, immigrants’ location pref-
erences and hypotheses
3.1 Migration theory
3.1.1 The economic motive
Since Ravenstein’s path breaking work on the determinants of migration
more than a century ago (Ravenstein 1885, 1889), income has been the focus
of economists’ attempt to explain migration. Ravenstein formulated general
laws of migration according to which migrants move from areas of low op-
8portunity to areas of high opportunity, where the choice of destination is
regulated by distance with migrants from rural areas often showing a ten-
dency to move ﬁrst towards nearby towns and then towards large cities.
Subsequent migration theory has expanded on his basic laws but the fea-
tures he suggested of the importance of the economic motive in the decision
to migrate, the negative inﬂu e n c eo fd i s t a n c ea n dt h er o l eo fs t e p - m i g r a t i o n
have not been invalidated.
Lee’s (1966) theory of migration, based on Ravenstein’s work, argues that
the social and economic factors that enter the decision to migrate are (1) fac-
tors associated with the area of origin, 2) factors associated with the potential
areas of destination, 3) intervening obstacles and 4) personal factors. He fur-
ther argues that each area of origin and of potential destination has a set of
negative and positive factors which pulls migrants towards them or pushes
them away. The greater the diﬀerences between these push and pull factors,
the greater is the probability of migration (push-pull hypothesis). His theory
emphasises macroeconomic factors as determinants of migration.
A dominant paradigm underlying much work on microlevel migration
research is the human capital model according to which migration is viewed
as an investment that is expected to pay oﬀ in the form of increased earnings
or other kinds of pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns (Sjaastad 1962; Bowles
1970). Non-money returns include changes in “psychic beneﬁts” as a result
of location preferences. Similarly, costs include both money and non-money
costs, such as costs of transport and psychic costs, respectively. Sjaastad
assumes that in deciding to move, migrants tend to maximize their net real
life-span income streams and that they have at least a rough idea of what their
life-span income streams would be at the present place of residence as well
as in the destination area and of the costs involved in migration. Modelling
the migration decision in this way, he actually ignores the importance of
non-pecuniary returns.
3.1.2 Other motives
Various motives for migration besides maximization of actual or expected
economic return have been pointed out in the migration literature. The lit-
erature of sociologists emphasises social mobility and social status attainment
as a motivation for migration and intraurban mobility (Sabagh et al. 1969).
Changes in and disruptions of life-cycle patterns can be other motives for
migration (Findley 1977) as well as motives for intraurban mobility due to
9residential dissatisfaction (Rossi 1955). The satisfaction-dissatisfaction mo-
tive for migration led Wolpert to develop the concept ’place utility’ deﬁned
as ”a positive or negative quantity, expressing the individual’s satisfaction
or dissatisfaction, respectively, with respect to that place” (Wolpert 1965, p.
162). Aﬃliation with family and friends in the potential areas of destination
may exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the decision to move and particularly
on the decision where to move for two reasons suggested by Ritchey (1976):
1) through increasing the potential migrant’s awareness of conditions and
opportunities there (the information hypothesis), and 2) by increasing the
migrant’s potential for adjustment through the availability of aid to relocate
there (the facilitating hypothesis). Similarly, maintenance of ties with family
and friends in the place of origin may be an important deterrent to migration
(the ’aﬃnity’ hypothesis) (Goldscheider 1971; Ritchey 1976). Finally, the ge-
ographer Zelinsky (1971) argued that the attainment of life-style preferences
has emerged as an additional motive for migration in advanced societies. See
f o ri n s t a n c eD eJ o n ga n dF a w c e t t( 1 9 8 1 )f o rab r i e fr e v i e wo ft h e s et h e o r i e s .
3.2 Immigrants’ location preferences
US studies on immigrants’ location choice ﬁnd the presence of fellow coun-
trymen to be an important determinant of immigrants’ location choice (see
e.g. Bartel 1989; Jaeger 2000; Bauer et al. 2002b). Diﬀerent theories have
been put forward to explain why this is so. First, there is the ethnic network
hypothesis according to which the presence of fellow countrymen constitutes
an ethnic network which facilitates new immigrants’ adjustment to the new
society (Piore 1979; Kobrin and Speare 1983). Second, there is the ethnic
goods theory proposed by Chiswick and Miller (2001) which emphasises that
living in an ethnic enclave reduces costs of consumption of so-called ethnic
goods. Such goods are deﬁned as the consumption characteristics of an eth-
nic group not shared with the host population, broadly deﬁned to include
market and non-market goods and services, including social interactions for
themselves and their children with people of the same origin. Finally, there
is the informational cascades or herd eﬀects theory suggested by Epstein
(2002). Herd eﬀects in location choice may exist if migrants have some pri-
vate information about diﬀerent locations and observe previous emigrants’
decisions, but are imperfectly informed about the attributes of the alterna-
tive locations and about the information signal that was driving previous
emigrants’ decisions. An important implication of herd eﬀects is that they
10may result in ineﬃciences. Some empirical evidence in favour of each of these
theories exists, see e.g. Bauer et al. (2002a) for supportive evidence of the
ethnic network theory, Chiswick and Miller (2001) for empirical evidence of
the ethnic goods theory and Bauer et al. (2002b) for empirical validation
of the herd eﬀects theory. Note however, that it is diﬃcult to identify the
eﬀects of each of these three factors separately in econometric analysis.
US studies which have investigated the importance of economic determi-
nants for immigrants’ location choice empirically include Bartel (1989) and
Jaeger (2000) who investigate whether the local labour market conditions
are another important determinant of immigrants’ location choice. The two
studies ﬁnd contrasting empirical evidence. Immigrants are found to be in-
sensitive to local labour market conditions in Bartel’s study whereas Jaeger
ﬁnds that all visa categories of immigrants, except spouses of US citizens,
are indeed sensitive to these conditions. Furthermore, the empirical studies
by Zavodny (1997) and Borjas (1999) have investigated the importance of
another potential economic determinant of immigrants’ location choice, the
local welfare system. They investigate the so-called welfare magnets hypoth-
esis, according to which new US immigrants are attracted to US states with
a relatively generous welfare system. Again contrasting evidence is found
in the two studies. Using macro data, Zavodny (1997) ﬁnds no evidence of
welfare seeking as a determinant of immigrants’ location choice. In contrast,
Borjas (1999) ﬁnds, using micro data, that immigrant welfare recipients are
much more likely to be geographically clustered in high-beneﬁt states, no-
tably in California, than immigrants who do not receive social beneﬁts, and
that they are more clustered than natives. However, controlling for other
factors which may potentially have inﬂuenced the location decision, Borjas
(1999) ﬁnds only weak empirical evidence of welfare magnets in the sense of
lack of statistical signiﬁcance of the results.
Little research exists on the location choice of immigrants outside the US.
The empirical analysis by Åslund (2001) of the initial and subsequent loca-
tion of immigrant to Sweden during the 1980s helps ﬁlling this important
gap. In addition, the study by Åslund (2001) emphasises that using data
with exogenous initial location is important for estimating the eﬀects of local
characteristics on subseqent migration; endogenous location leads to under-
rating of their importance due to the initial sorting across locations. Based
on administrative register data with exogenous initial location of refugees,
Åslund (2001) ﬁnds that placed refugees in Sweden leave locations with small
populations and are attracted to large regions. The presence of co-nationals
11and immigrants in general is also important. By and large, these ﬁndings
conform with the US results. In addition, refugees are aﬀected by labour
market prospects; refugees tend to leave locations with high overall unem-
ployment and move to municipalities with high immigrant employment rates
and high average earnings, given their other characteristics. On the other
hand, Åslund ﬁnds no evidence of direct welfare seeking; however, refugees
move to places with prevalent welfare receipiency and large local public sec-
tors. Concerning the success of the dispersal policy, he ﬁn d st h a t3 8 %o f
the refugee immigrants who were placed according to the Whole of Sweden
Strategy during 1987-1989 had relocated to other municipalities within four
years after the initial settlement.
Djuve and Kavli (2000) evaluate the Norwegian dispersal policy on new
refugees. Administrative register data is linked to survey data, both of which
cover the period 1994-1996. The latter primarily consist of refugee interviews
and interviews of employees in 120 municipalities working in the area of inte-
gration of immigrants. The major weakness of the analysis is that it contains
only descriptive evidence. The main ﬁndings are, ﬁrst, that one third of the
new refugees moved away from the municipality of assignment within ﬁve
years, second, that refugees tended to move away from the thinly populated
and cold northern part of the country and away from small, non-central mu-
nicipalities in the rest of the country, and third, that closeness to family and
employment opportunities appeared to be important pull factors. Finally,
interviews with employees working in non-central municipalities indicated
that refugees who had formerly lived in big cities were more likely to move
away from such municipalities than refugees from rural areas.
Finally, using an extremely rich Danish administrative longitudinal regis-
ter data set Hummelgaard et al. (1995) investigate the initial and subsequent
location choice of immigrants in Denmark from 1984 to 1991. Descriptive
ﬁndings show that non-refugee immigrants in Denmark are highly geograph-
ically clustered in the larger cities, in particular in the metropolitan area; in
1991 72 % lived in the metropolitan area. In addition, these immigrants are
found to have very low migration rates. In contrast, refugee immigrants are
found to be much more dispersed across locations which is to be expected
since refugees who arrived later than 1985 were dispersed across locations, see
the next section. However, estimation results from a discrete choice model
for cross-municipal relocation showed relatively high subsequent migration
rates away from municipalities with a low share of fellow countrymen, a low
overall share of immigrants and few rental ﬂats controlling for the rich set of
12personal attributes.3
3.3 Hypotheses
In view of the general migration theory and previous ﬁndings on immigrants’
location choice, I hypothesise that refugees who are subject to a dispersal
policy may subseqently migrate to another region if it oﬀers better economic
prospects, especially employment prospects, if friends, family or more fellow
countrymen as such live there, if it allows for attainment of life style pref-
erences or if life-cycle changes take place such as marriage or divorce which
may induce housing or location dissatisfaction. In addition, I expect insti-
tutions for vocational and higher education within reach to be an important
factor for location satisfaction, because education has been found to be an
important factor for immigrants’ employment probability in Denmark, at
least in part due to the high eﬀective minimum wages (Husted et al. 2001).
However, refugees may lack education because on average they are young at
arrival to Denmark and may have been unable to ﬁnish their education in
the home country or their education may not be transferable. In contrast,
interregional diﬀerences in wage prospects are likely to play only a modest
role in migration decisions of refugees in Demark, where wages are generally
negotiated through collective bargaining. Similarly, direct welfare seeking is
not likely to be a major motive for migration in Denmark, since in general
the entitlement to and level of means-tested social beneﬁts are decided upon
by national law (Linderoth et al. 1996). However, interregional diﬀerences
in the extent to which recipients of social beneﬁts are required to participate
in active labour market programmes may exist and may consequently aﬀect
the migration propensity of refugees according to individual preferences for
participation versus non-participation.
I, furthermore, expect diﬀerent groups of refugees to have diﬀerent mi-
gration propensities due to diﬀerences in costs of migration and expected
returns from migration. The costs of migration may, for instance, be higher
3Note that this study uses the municipality of residence as the geographical unit of
location which is a much smaller geographical area than SMSAs typically used in US
studies. This explains the latter ﬁnding that housing (adjustment) matters for subsequent
location choice. Furthermore, note that in 1991 50% of refugees in Denmark lived in public
housing compared to 15 percent of the overall population (Hummelgaard et al. 1995). The
share of refugees in owner-occuppied dwellings constituted only 23% although 67% of the
overall Danish population lived in such housing.
13for couples than for singles and for individuals with children. Young and
unemployed refugees may, for instance, be more sensitive to interregional
diﬀerences in employment prospects than older and employed refugees due
to higher expected returns from migration.
4 Theoretical and econometric model
4.1 A migration model based on the human capital
investment approach
The immigrant faces a problem of ﬁnding an optimal location in the host
country, i.e. he or she has to decide whether or not to move away from
the initial location of placement and decide on the destination. In line with
the human capital model I model the migration decision as if the potential
migrant weighs the net expected pecuniary and mental beneﬁts of moving
against the expected pecuniary and mental costs of moving. If the former
exceeds the latter migration will take place. The model presented is similar
to the migration model by Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980).
Let Uj,j= s,m,l denote the expected utility for individual i of moving to
destination j, which is either a small (subscript s), medium-sized (subscript
m) or large (subscript l) municipality. Similarly, let Up denote the expected
utility of individual i of staying in the municipality of placement (subscript
p). C denotes the expected moving costs which are assumed to be the same
across destinations but not across individuals.
An individual i stays in the municipality of placement if
Uj − Up ≤ C, for all j (1)
i.e. if the costs of moving exceed the expected net utility of migration for
all destinations.
If, on the other hand,
Uj − Up >Cfor at least one j (2)
then an individual i migrates to the destination j that yields the highest
expected net utility, i.e. that maximizes Uj − Up.
However, the expected utilities at the current location and in alternative
destinations are not directly observed, nor are mobility costs. Assume instead




jβj + εj (3)
Up = X
0
pβp + εp (4)
C = Z
0γ + µ (5)
where Xj and Xp are vectors of demographic and socioeconomic charac-
teristics of individual i and characteristics of location j and p, respectively,
Z is a vector of demographic characteristics of individual i and α, β and γ
are parameters to be estimated. εj, εp and µ are stochastic errors.
Let Mj denote the net expected utility of migration to destination j net






0γ + εj − εp − µ (6)
Furthermore, let M∗ denote the maximum net expected utility of migra-
tion when maximising over the choice set of destinations
M
∗ =m a x
j
Mj (7)
Then individual i0s probability of migration is given as
Pr(M
∗ > 0) (8)
In addition, individual i0s probability of migration to location j is given
by the joint probability
Pr(Mj = M
∗,M
∗ > 0) = Pr(Mj = M
∗|M
∗ > 0) ∗ Pr(M
∗ > 0) (9)
Section 6 describes the variables included in the vectors Xj,X p and Z.
154.2 Econometric speciﬁcation
4.2.1 The MPH model
Let the random variable T denote time until exit from the municipality of
placement. Let xt be the vector of time-varying observed covariates, speciﬁ-
cally location characteristics and demographic and socioeconomic character-
istics of the individual and let v be unobserved heterogeneity.
The key variable in duration models is the hazard rate which in continous
time is deﬁned as the transition rate out of the state of interest at time t,
conditional on being in the state at least until t, i.e.
h(t) = lim
dt→0
P(t<T≤ t + dt|T>t )
dt
(10)
The hazard function for exit from the municipality of placement is spec-
iﬁed as a mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model
h(t|xt,v)=λ(t) · exp(x
0β + v) (11)
λ(t) denotes the baseline hazard which captures duration dependence
and exp(x0β+v) is a scale function which captures the eﬀect of observed and
unobserved individual-speciﬁc characteristics.4






while the likelihood of a right-censored residential spell is given by the





where S(t|xt,v) is the survivor function.
Deﬁnition of a non-censoring indicator d t h a tt a k e st h ev a l u e1i far e s -
idential spell is not right-censored and 0 otherwise then allows one to write
the likelihood contribution of a residential spell as
4The main functional form implication of the proportional hazard model is that covari-






The overall empirical hazard function for time until out-migration is
shown in Figure 4.1.
Ic h o o s eaﬂexible model for the unobserved covariates. Let G denote the
cumulative distribution function for the unobserved covariate in the hazard
rate, v. Then the total likelihood contribution from a residential spell of an
individual is the product of the likelihood contribution of the residential spell





The intuition is that because an individual’s type is not known, the likeli-
hood function is a mixture over types weighted by their sample probabilities
(Heckman and Singer 1984).
The marginal distribution of the unobserved term is speciﬁed as a discrete
distribution with two unrestricted mass point locations. Let vm,m=1 ,2
denote the two mass-points of v.E a c hc o m b i n a t i o ni so b s e r v e dw i t hp r o b a -
bility pi to be estimated, with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for i =1 ,2 and
P2
i=1 pi =1 . We
normalise the distribution of the unobserved term by letting v1 =0 .
The baseline hazard function is assumed to be piecewise constant, i.e.
λ(t)=e x p ( αk),k =1 ,...,K, where K is the number of intervals of the
baseline hazard function. The length of the baseline intervals is chosen by
inspection of the empirical hazard function for exit from municipality of
placement, see Figure 4.1.5
5The empirical hazard rate is seen to have spikes at multiples of 12 months. This is
a statistical artifact stemming from the fact that the Immigrant Data Set only contain
information on the last address change of an individual in each year. As a consequence,
the later an address change takes place during the year, the more likely it is to be included
in the Immigrant Data Set. Speciﬁcally, only 5% of the total number of address changes
registered in the Refugee Data Set are registered to take place in January as opposed to
as much as 12.7% in December.
17Figure 4.1
























Women4.2.2 The MPH competing risk model
According to the theoretical model speciﬁcation in Section 4, time until exit
from the municipality of placement, T,m a ye n df o rt h r e ed i ﬀerent reasons.
Let the random variable Tj denote time until exit to destination j from the





The destination-speciﬁc hazard functions, the hazard functions for exit
to destination j from the municipality of placement, are speciﬁed as mixed
proportional hazard (MPH) models
hj(tj|xtj,v j)=λj(tj) · exp(x
0
tjβj + vj) (16)
where λj(tj) denotes the destination-speciﬁc baseline hazard which cap-
tures duration dependence of time until exit to destination j and exp(x0
tjβj+
vj) is the destination-speciﬁc scale function which captures the eﬀect of ob-
served and unobserved individual-speciﬁc characteristics on the destination-
speciﬁc hazard rate. Hence, the overall hazard function for exit from munic-
ipality of placement is given as




The likelihood contribution of a completed residential spell ending in an





while the likelihood of a right-censored residential spell is given by the





where S(tj|xtj,v j) is the destination-speciﬁc survivor function.
Deﬁnition of a non-censoring indicator dj that takes the value 1 if a
destination-speciﬁc residential spell is not right-censored and 0 otherwise
19then allows one to write the likelihood contribution of a destination-speciﬁc
residential spell as





Ic h o o s eaﬂexible model for the unobserved covariates. I allow for a
separate unobserved covariate in each of the three destination-speciﬁch a z a r d
rates denoted vj and arbitrary correlation between them in order to obtain
unbiased estimates of the eﬀects of observed covariates on the hazard rates.
Let H denote the joint cumulative distribution function for vj.
The total likelihood contribution from a residential spell of an individ-
ual is the product of the likelihood contribution of each destination-speciﬁc









dH(vs,v m,v l) (21)
Hence, the overall likelihood function is a mixture over types weighted by
their sample probabilities (Heckman and Singer 1984).
The marginal distributions of the unobserved terms are speciﬁed as dis-
crete distributions with two unrestricted mass point locations. Let vm
j ,
m =1 ,2 denote the two mass-points of vj. This provides maximum ﬂex-
ibility among computationally feasible speciﬁcations (Abbring et al. 2000).
This gives rise to 23, i.e. 8, possible combinations of unobserved scalar het-
erogeneity across destination-speciﬁc residential spells. Each combination is
observed with probability pi to be estimated, with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for i =1,...,8,
and
P8
i=1 pi =1 .We normalise the distribution of the unobservables by let-
ting v1
j =0for j = s,m,l.
The baseline hazard functions are assumed to be piecewise constant, i.e.
λj(tj)=e x p ( αjk),k =1 ,...,Kj, j = s,m,l, where Kj is the number of
intervals of the baseline hazard of residential spell of type j.T h el e n g t ho f
the baseline intervals is chosen by inspection of the empirical destination-
speciﬁc hazard functions for exit from municipality of residence, see Figures
4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.







































































Given normalisations of the mean of the unobserved covariates (ﬁnite means)
and weak requirements for variation in the observed covariates, the MPH
model with and without competing risks is identiﬁed non-parametrically if
the observed covariates are independent of unobserved characteristics inﬂu-
encing the outcome of interest, i.e. the probability of out-migration to des-
tination j (Elbers and Ridder 1982; Abbring and van den Berg 2000).
In particular, the latter identiﬁcation condition implies that initial settle-
ment is independent of any unobservable individual-speciﬁcc h a r a c t e r i s t i ci n
the outcome equation. This requirement is satisﬁed if the refugee character-
istics which have inﬂuenced the actual settlement are observable so that we
can control for them in the model.
As mentioned in Section 2, the related study Damm (2003) concludes that
the initial settlement of new refugees may have been inﬂuenced by family sta-
tus, need of medical or psychological treatment, educational needs, location
of close family and friends and nationality at the time of immigration as
well as year of immigration. Three of these characteristics are observed in
administrative register data (described below): family status as measured by
marital status and number of children, nationality and year of immigration.
In Damm (2003), it is argued that age and nationality may be decent proxies
for educational needs and that nationality and size of the ethnic stock may
be decent proxies for whether the individual had close family and friends in
Denmark at the time of arrival. In contrast, no decent proxy for need of
special medical or psychological treatment is present in the registers. Hence,
t h ed a t aa th a n de n a b l e sm et oc o n d i t i o no nﬁve of the six variables which
may have inﬂuenced the initial settlement of an individual. In consequence,
the variables marital status, number of children, nationality, year of immi-
gration, age and size of the ethnic stock are included as controls in the MPH
models. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that initial settlement is
fairly independent of unobserved characteristics. Consequently, the condition
for model identiﬁcation should be satisﬁed.
225D a t a
5.1 Data sources
I use data from two data sources. First, the longitudinal administrative
register data set of Statistics Denmark on all immigrants in Denmark from
1984-1998, henceforth the Immigrant Data Set. From that data set, ob-
servations on immigrants from refugee-sending countries from October 1985
to December 1996 are extracted. Sampled individuals are observed from
the year following immigration, at the earliest 1986, until 1998. Hence, the
maximum length of observation is 13 years.6 Second, Statistics Denmark’s
website ’Statistik Banken’ from which I have extracted yearly observations
on municipalities from 1986 to 1998 mainly on local labour market, housing
market and population characteristics.
The Immigrant Data Set contains information on a wide variety of individ-
ual characteristics, demographic, socioeconomic, housing and labour market
states. Most importantly, the data set is informative about the individual’s
county and municipality of residence (at the end of the year in case the person
have moved during the year) and the date of the last residential move of the
individual (by the end of the year). Such information is available because in
Denmark it is determined by law to report your residential move to the local
municipality of destination within a fortnight after the move. These variables
enable me to construct spells for municipality of residence for each individ-
ual. The duration of these spells is measured in months. Since the analysis
concerns determinants of the ﬁrst migration investment after placement, use
is only made of the ﬁrst residential spell after placement. But information
on the number of inhabitants in the municipality of destination following the
ﬁrst cross-municipality move after placement is exploited as well.
However, the data set has some weaknesses for the analysis at hand. First,
it does not include information on visa category necessary for straightforward
extraction of refugees from the population of immigrants. Instead, an algo-
rithm based on the country of origin and year of ﬁrst immigration to Den-
mark of the individual was used to extract immigrants from refugee-sending
countries (17 countries) in known periods during 1985-1996. The validity of
the algorithm was investigated in Damm (2003) by comparison of the ethnic
composition of the extracted sample by year of immigration, presented in
6The Institute of Local Government Studies, Copenhagen, has kindly put the data at
my disposal.
23Table A.1 in the Appendix, with the ethnic composition of refugees granted
a s y l u mf o re a c hy e a ra c c o r d i n gt oo ﬃcial statistics published by Statistics
Denmark. The algorithm was found to be valid, since the ethnic composi-
tion of the sample is consistent with the oﬃcial ethnic composition of the
refugee group, except that a few refugee-sending countries from which only
a small number of refugees originate are left out of the extracted sample.
Second, since the ﬁrst year of observation for an individual is the year fol-
lowing the year of immigration, all information on the individuals is missing
from the date of ﬁrst immigration until January the following year.
Third, refugees on average spend 6-7 months in temporary housing, possi-
bly in other municipalities of residence than the municipalities of placement.
The data set does not contain exact information on the municipality of place-
ment. Instead, use has been made of what we know about the beginning of a
refugee’s residential career after asylum as described in the previous section.
In particular, the following algorithm was used to determine the municipality
of placement. The ﬁrst municipality of residence observed for an individual
is treated as the municipality of placement in the following three cases: 1) if
the individual got asylum during the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ey e a ro fﬁrst immigra-
tion, 2) if the individual got asylum during the second half of the year of ﬁrst
immigration and did not carry out a cross-municipal move during the ﬁrst
year of observation, and 3) if the individual got asylum during the second half
of the year of ﬁrst immigration, carried out a cross-municipal, intra-county
move during the ﬁrst year of observation. If, on the other hand, an individ-
ual got asylum during the second half of the year of ﬁrst immigration and
carried out a cross-county move during the ﬁrst year of observation, I treat
the ﬁrst municipality of residence as the municipality in which the refugee
had temporary housing. In that case, the residential spell of the municipal-
ity of placement begins in the month following the cross-county move of the
individual. In the other three cases, the residential spell of the municipality
of placement begins in January following the year of ﬁrst immigration. Since
we do not observe the date at which individuals move to the municipality of
placement in cases 1-3, the residential spell of the municipality of placement
may be left-censored for these individuals. However, I expect the degree of
left-censoring to be small and therefore, do not take it into account in the
econometric analysis. In contrast, the residential spell of municipality of
p l a c e m e n tb e g i n sa ts o m et i m ed u r i n gt h eﬁr s ty e a ro fo b s e r v a t i o nf o rt h e
10% of the individuals who were found to live in temporary housing when
ﬁrst observed in the data.
24Observations on individuals who immigrated to Denmark in 1997 have
been excluded from the analysis, because we only observe these individuals in
one year and consequently we are unable to determine their municipality of
placement using the algorithm described earlier. Observations on individuals
n o to b s e r v e di nt h eﬁrst year following ﬁrst immigration are also excluded
from the analysis, because in that case information on the initial municipality
of residence may be missing. Observations following the ﬁrst residential spell,
i.e. the spell of the municipality of placement, are dropped from the extracted
data set due to the focus of the analysis, the ﬁrst migration investment.
Male and female refugees may have diﬀerent location preferences. To in-
vestigate whether this is the case, I carry out the empirical analysis separately
for male and female refugees.
The data set for refugees, henceforth the Refugee Data Set, consists of
25,674 male and 22,228 female individuals.
5.2 Descriptive statistics
5.2.1 County level
Denmark is administered at three levels: the state, the county and the mu-
nicipal level. Denmark has 14 counties, two county municipalities and 275
municipalities. Table 5.1 presents the distribution of the immigrant popu-
lation across counties in the year in which the dispersal policy was imple-
mented and at the end of the dispersal policy period as well as the initial
geographical distribution of refugees in the Refugee Data Set. In both years,
immigrants were overrepresented in three counties: Copenhagen and Fred-
eriksberg county municipalities and Copenhagen county that constitute the
Greater Copenhagen area and, in addition, a neighbouring county of Copen-
hagen county, Frederiksborg county. Turning to the initial geographical dis-
tribution of refugees, note the close correspondence between each county’s
share of refugees and the population share of the county with the exception
of Copenhagen county. This conﬁrms that the dispersal policy was success-
ful in distributing new refugees equally across counties. See Table A.2 in the
Appendix for the initial geographical distribution of refugees across counties
for each ethnic group, separately.7
7To put the dispersal policy into perspective, note that refugees subject to the dispersal
policy accounted for only around 42% of the total number of immigrants between October
1985 and September 1998. The immigrant population in DK increased from 164,045 in
25Table 5.1 Geographic distribution of subgroups of the Danish population
across counties. Per cent.
Year: 1986 1998 1986-97




Frederiksberg mun. 10.96 28.40 10.91 25.15 12.00
Copenhagen 11.91 19.81 11.53 17.69 6.73
Frederiksborg 6.59 9.01 6.80 7.17 5.26
Roskilde 4.14 3.59 4.31 3.68 2.66
West Zealand 5.48 3.43 5.52 3.74 5.49
Storstrøm 5.03 2.56 4.88 2.87 5.59
Other islands:
Bornholm 0.92 0.33 0.84 0.38 0.58
Funen 8.90 6.00 8.91 7.28 11.13
Jutland:
Southern Jutland 4.88 5.03 4.79 4.07 4.28
Ribe 4.22 2.21 4.23 2.70 5.23
Vejle 6.40 3.53 6.51 4.52 7.73
Ringkoebing 5.18 2.04 5.14 2.78 4.84
Århus 11.44 8.78 11.93 11.05 13.20
Viborg 4.51 1.37 4.40 1.93 4.84
Northern Jutland 9.43 3.92 9.31 4.98 10.46
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Frequencies 5,116,153 174,050 5,294,762 347,031 47,902
Source: The Immigrant Data Set and the Refugee Data Set.
Turning to the extent to which placed refugees migrated subsequently, Ta-
b l e5 . 2s h o w st h a tb y1 9 9 82 6 %o ft h er e f u g e e si nt h eR e f u g e eD a t aS e th a d
moved to another county subsequently. Interestingly, the share of migrants
from a given county is, in general, close the county’s share of placed refugees;
this is seen by comparison with Table 5.1. Funen and Århus counties con-
stitute two exceptions by having a smaller share of out-migrants than their
share of placed refugees. This indicates that the fraction of out-migration
1985 to 347,131 in 1998 (the Immigrant Data Set). The total number of residence permits
granted for asylum reasons between 1986 and 1998 was 76,209 (Statistical Yearbooks 1992,
1997, 2001).
26of placed refugees is approximately equal, around 26%, across counties. In
contrast, a clear pattern emerges concerning the choice of destination. The
three most populated counties, Copenhagen and Frederiksberg county mu-
nicipalities, Copenhagen county and Århus county which together account
for 35% of the Danish population, were the choice of destination for 58%
of the refugee migrants. The migrants mainly come from within the same
region. In particular, migrants to the Greater Copenhagen area mainly come
from another county within the Greater Copenhagen area and from nearby
counties. Similarly, migrants to Århus tend to come from other counties in
the region. Note that migration within the Greater Copenhagen area actu-
ally accounts for 30% of the total migration of placed refugees to the Greater
Copenhagen area.
Table 5.3 reports the out- and in-migration rates of placed refugees rel-
ative to the number of refugees initially placed in the county. The out-
migration rate is calculated as the share of refugees placed in the county
during the observation period who move across the county. The in-migration
rate is calculated as the number of ﬁrst-time movers among placed refugees
who move to the county out of the total number of refugees initially placed
in the county. It becomes apparent that the migration pattern just described
in terms of the initial distribution of refugees implies very high positive net
in-migration rates for the two counties in the capital, Copenhagen county
and Copenhagen and Frederiksberg county municipalites, and a more mod-
erate positive net in-migration rate for the second largest municipality in
Denmark, Århus. With one exception, all remaining counties have negative
net in-migration rates of ﬁrst-time movers among placed refugees.
27Table 5.2 Migration pattern at the county level for first-time migrants among placed refugees. 
Per cent of movers from and to each county. Part A. 
Region County of destination: Copenhagen and  Copenhagen Frederiksborg Roskilde West Zealand Storstrøm Bornholm
Frederiksberg munic.
County of placement:
Zealand: Copenhagen and 
Frederiksberg munic. 0 8.25 1.20 0.81 0.30 0.18 0.07
Copenhagen 5.90 0 0.50 0.91 0.09 0.06 0.03
Frederiksborg 3.5 1.68 0 0.41 0.19 0.06 0
Roskilde 1.57 1.24 0.18 0 0.12 0.15 0
West Zealand 2.60 1.48 0.46 0.71 0 0.24 0
Storstrøm 2.29 1.39 0.62 0.47 0.64 0 0
Other islands: Bornholm 0.05 0.02 0.02 0 0.06 0.02 0
Funen 1.53 0.63 0.40 0.14 0.23 0.67 0
Jutland: Southern Jutland 1.29 0.41 0.29 0.24 0.17 0.09 0.01
Ribe 1.83 0.77 0.30 0.20 0.11 0.12 0
Vejle 1.20 0.61 0.10 0.06 0.36 0.11 0
Ringkøbing 0.80 0.27 0.11 0.08 0.24 0.07 0.01
Århus 1.70 0.81 0.34 0.24 0.19 0.15 0
Viborg 1.06 0.53 0.23 0.07 0.23 0.20 0.01
Northern Jutland 2.24 0.96 0.36 0.27 0.23 0.25 0
% of all movers to destination 27.56 19.06 5.10 4.62 3.15 2.37 0.13
Source: The Refugee Data Set.
Note: Total number of first-time migrants among placed refugees: 12,301Table 5.2 Migration pattern at the county level for first-time migrants among placed refugees. 
Per cent of movers from and to each county. Part B.
Region County of destination Funen Southern  Ribe Vejle Ringkøbing Århus Viborg Northern  % of all movers
Jutland Jutland from destination
County of placement:
Zealand: Copenhagen and 
Frederiksberg munic. 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.26 0.03 0.14 11.79
Copenhagen 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.03 7.89
Frederiksborg 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.20 0.01 0.12 6.48
Roskilde 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.13 0.04 0.13 3.68
West Zealand 0.34 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.61 0.14 0.17 7.56
Storstrøm 0.38 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.59 0.04 0.28 7.34
Other islands: Bornholm 0 0.07 0 0.03 0 0.03 0 0 0.30
Funen 0 0.30 0.35 0.68 0.29 0.86 0.15 0.26 6.50
Jutland: Southern Jutland 0.67 0 0.42 0.46 0.23 0.95 0.04 0.18 5.45
Ribe 0.71 0.43 0 0.81 0.25 1.06 0.04 0.25 6.89
Vejle 1.20 0.40 0.49 0 0.33 1.84 0.11 0.24 7.03
Ringkøbing 0.23 0.20 0.75 0.36 0 0.54 0.22 0.15 4.02
Århus 0.70 0.28 0.37 1.30 0.41 0 0.32 0.70 7.52
Viborg 0.54 0.30 0.30 0.63 0.45 2.02 0 0.52 7.09
Northern Jutland 0.90 0.61 0.53 0.59 0.60 2.50 0.42 0 10.46
All 6.15 2.95 3.75 5.53 3.16 11.70 1.60 3.17 100.00
Source: The Refugee Data Set.
Note: Total number of first-time migrants among placed refugees: 12,301Table 5.3 In- and out-migration rates of ﬁrst-time refugee migrants at the
county level.
Refugees Out-migration In-migration Net migration
County Freq. initially Rate Rate Rate
Zealand:
Copenhagen &
Frederiksberg munic. 5,738 0.25 0.59 0.34
Copenhagen 3,222 0.30 0.73 0.43
Frederiksborg 2,520 0.32 0.25 -0.07
Roskilde 1,273 0.36 0.45 0.09
West Zealand 2,630 0.35 0.15 -0.21
Storstrøm 2,676 0.34 0.11 -0.23
Other islands:
Bornholm 280 0.13 0.06 -0.08
Funen 5,332 0.15 0.14 -0.01
Jutland:
Southern Jutland 2,049 0.33 0.18 -0.15
Ribe 2,507 0.34 0.18 -0.15
Vejle 3,704 0.23 0.18 -0.05
Ringkøbing 2,321 0.21 0.17 -0.05
Århus 6,323 0.15 0.23 0.08
Viborg 2,318 0.38 0.08 -0.29
Northern Jutland 5,009 0.26 0.08 -0.18
All 47,902 0.26 0.26 0.00
Source: The Refugee Data Set.
5.2.2 Municipality level
To investigate the initial settlement of new refugees across municipalities, I
divide the 275 Danish municipalities into three categories according to the
number of inhabitants. A small municipality is deﬁned as having less than
10,000 inhabitants; a medium-sized municipality has 10,000-100,000 inhab-
itants; a large municipality is deﬁned as having more than 100,000 inhabi-
tants. According to this deﬁnition, Denmark has four large municipalities:
Copenhagen, Århus, Odense and Ålborg. Large and medium-sized munic-
ipalities are predominantly urban areas whereas small municipalities cover
urban areas as well as rural districts. Table 5.4 shows the geographical dis-
30tribution of the Danish population, the immigrant population and the initial
geographical distribution of refugees in the Refugee Data Set across these
three municipality size categories. The table shows that the refugees in the
Refugee Data Set were slightly overrepresented in the large municipalities
and slightly underrepresented in the medium-sized and small municipalities
compared to the overall distribution of the Danish population. Further-
more, comparison with the geographical distribution of the total immigrant
population across municipalities shows that due to the dispersal policy the
percentage of refugees who initially lived in small municipalities was twice as
large as the percentage of immigrants as such. In addition, a smaller share
of refugees initially lived in a large municipality compared to the immigrant
population as such.
Table 5.4 Geographical distribution of subgroups of the Danish population
across municipality size categories: Per cent.
Year 1986 1998 1986-97
Group of population Total Immigrant Total Immigrant Refugee Refugee
Municipality Men Women
Small 19.2 7.6 17.7 7.2 16 14
Medium 60.2 56.2 61.2 55.8 56 56
Large 20.6 36.2 21.1 37.0 28 30
All 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: The Immigrant Data Set.
Note: The geographical distribution reported for refugees is their initial geo-
graphical distribution.
Table 5.5 shows the out-migration rates across municipality size cate-
gories for male and female refugees, separately. The out-migration rate is
calculated as the share of placed refugees in the respective municipality size
category that move across the municipality border during the observation
period. Hence, the term ’migrant’ now includes refugees who carry out an
intra-county, but inter-municipal, move in addition to refugees who carry
out an intercounty move. The overall out-migration rate during the period
of observation was 39% for men and 27% for women. However, the share
of movers is strongly, negatively correlated with the initial municipality size.
The out-migration rate for refugees placed in small municipalities was as high
as 50% for men and 36% for women. This suggests that small municipalities
have characteristics which push refugees away, especially male refugees.
31Furthermore, as one would expect it, the share of movers is strongly, nega-
tively correlated with year of immigration, i.e. strongly, positively correlated
with years since migration, see Table 5.6. As little as 36% of male refugees
still live in the municipality of assignment 14 years after immigration. The
pattern raises the question whether it is just a matter of, say, 20 years since
immigration, before all placed refugees will have left their municipality of
assignment.
Table 5.5 Out-migration rates for refugees across municipality size cate-
gories. Per cent.
Out-migration rates





Source: The Refugee Data Set.
Table 5.6 Percent movers among refugees across each year of immigration.














Source: The Refugee Data Set.
32Table 5.7 Average duration of stay in municipality of placement. Months.
Men Women
Initial municipality Movers Stayers All Movers Stayers All
Small 17.1 42.1 29.9 18.0 42.3 33.3
Medium 24.8 57.8 43.7 25.9 55.9 47.3
Large 27.7 65.5 55.4 25.0 61.6 55.1
All 23.9 58.3 44.8 24.2 56.2 47.7
Source: The Refugee Data Set.
Table 5.7 reveals that on average movers make the ﬁrst migration in-
vestment two years after settlement in the municipality of placement. But
migrants from small municipalities tend to migrate already after one and a
half year. However, recall from Section 2 that placement in small municipal-
ities mainly occurred during the second half of the dispersal policy period.
Hence, the censoring of the data implies that duration in a small municipality
is bound to be relatively short for movers.
Table 5.8 Moving patterns of male refugee movers. Per cent.
Destination municipality Small Medium Large Total moves
Initial municipality out of
Small 21 2 519
Medium 53 1 2 6 62
Large 11 2 619
Total moves into 85 5 3 7 100
Source: The Refugee Data Set.
Table 5.9 Moving patterns of female refugee movers. Percent.
Destination municipality Small Medium Large Total moves
Initial municipality out of
Small 21 4 420
Medium 43 0 2 7 60
Large 11 3 620
Total moves into 65 7 3 7 100
Source: The Refugee Data Set.
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that more than 92% of the movers migrated to
medium-sized or large municipalities. However, turning to the net inﬂow
rates calculated as the net inﬂow relative to the sum of refugee migrants,
33we see that only large municipalities experienced a positive net inﬂow of
refugees, of around 0.18. In contrast, small and medium municipalities expe-
rienced a negative net inﬂow, i.e. a positive net outﬂow, of around 0.12 and
0.05 respectively. To put these net inﬂow rates for refugees into perspective,
note the following statistical fact for the Danish population as such. Between
1981 and 1996 small municipalities experienced a net population decrease of
2%, while medium-sized and large municipalities experienced a net popula-
tion increase of 3.5% (Statistical Yearbook, 1997, Table 43). Hence, the net
outﬂow rates for small municipalities are much higher for refugees than for
the total Danish population.
Figures 5.1-5.4 are used to examine the consequences of the positive net
inﬂow to the larger municipalities. The ﬁgures illustrate the mean ethnic
concentration of the diﬀerent ethnic refugee groups across the larger munici-
palities during the period of observation. Note that the change in concentra-
tions from one year to another are a result of the dispersal of new arrivals of
refugees as well as internal migration of earlier arrivals. The ﬁgures indicate
that not all ethnic refugee groups have become more concentrated in the
larger municipalities. Towards the end of the observation period, refugees
from Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Chile and refugees without citizenship have be-
come more concentrated in the larger municipalities, whereas refugees from
Poland, Rumania, Afghanistan and Ethiopia have become less concentrated
in those municipalities. The remaining ethnic groups, i.e. refugees from Sri
Lanka, Vietnam and the Former Yugoslavia, have had fairly constant rates
of ethnic concentration in the larger municipalities over the years. There are
many possible explanations for these diﬀerences in ethnic concentration in
the larger municipalities, including diﬀerences in preference for larger mu-
nicipalities between ethnic groups depending on whether or not the refugees
originate from large urban areas in the home country, ethnic diﬀerences in
cultural distance between the respective ethnic group and the majority pop-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CroatiaOverall, however, the descriptive evidence presented in this subsection in-
dicates that refugees’ place utility is increasing in the number of inhabitants.
Movers were overrepresented among refugees placed in small municipalities
and migration occurred towards the larger, urban areas. Therefore, the dis-
persal policy did not achieve an equal distribution of refugees across small,
medium and larger municipalities in the medium run.
However, the municipality size is likely to be correlated with numerous
other factors which potentially inﬂuence refugees’ migration decision. To
examine this, I have calculated the means of the labour market, housing
market and population composition characteristics across small, medium and
large municipalities, separately. The results for 1993 are presented in Table
5.10.
The variation in municipality characteristics is substantial across the
three size categories of municipalities. Large municipalities are, on average,
characterised by a much larger immigrant population, higher concentrations
of immigrants from refugee-sending countries, a slightly higher regional un-
employment rate, a much higher number of institutions for vocational and
higher education, a much higher share of public housing and a much lower
share of right-wing votes at the latest municipal election than the average
medium-sized or small municipality.
Not surprisingly, there is even more variation in municipality character-
istics across all municipalities. In 1993, the municipality with the highest
percentage of immigrants, Copenhagen, had 18.3% immigrants while the mu-
nicipality with the smallest percentage, Thyholm, only had 0.5%. There is
also substantial variation in the ethnic concentration across municipalities.
20.9% of all immigrants from Iraq, for instance, resided in Copenhagen while
157 municipalites had no Iraqi immigrants. In 1993, the regional unem-
ployment rate varied from 23.1 to 8.6%, for Læsø and Billund municipali-
ties, respectively. In addition, there is considerable variation in municipality
characteristics across calendar years, especially in the regional unemployment
which ranges from 3.6% for Grindsted in 1998 to 24.2% for Læsø in 1994.
37Table 5.10 Municipality characteristics in 1993. Means (std. dev.). 
By municipality size categories
Municipality size category Small Medium Large
Characteristics Mean Mean Mean
Inhabitants 6,960.42 23,769.17 268,867.50
(1,696.40) (15,882.71) (140,389.87)
Reg. unempl. rate 13.18 12.59 14.14
(2.17) (2.03) (1.84)
% of county jobs  2.06 7.42 54.86
(1.82) (6.80) (23.43)
# educ. voc. institutions 0.14 1.74 21.25
(0.39) (2.22) (7.80)
% public housing 6.76 17.29 24.67
(3.80) (12.47) (4.71)
% right-wing votes 53.27 50.40 37.48
(15.22) (13.01) (6.35)
% immigrants 1.80 3.77 7.34
(0.85) (2.84) (3.49)
Polish concentration 0.06 0.38 10.55
(0.06) (0.54) (9.61)
Iraqi conc. 0.03 0.36 12.24
(0.08) (0.68) (8.24)
Iranian conc. 0.01 0.37 12.17
(0.03) (0.58) (5.82)
Vietnamese conc. 0.01 0.40 11.34
(0.03) (0.83) (6.29)
Tamil conc. 0.11 0.58 2.18
(0.21) (1.14) (0.76)
No citizenship conc. 0.03 0.41 10.47
(0.05) (0.60) (5.00)
Ethiopian conc. 0.01 0.27 15.61
(0.05) (1.28) (17.78)
Afghanistan conc. 0.02 0.46 9.02
(0.16) (1.51) (9.42)
Somalian conc. 0.04 0.35 12.17
(0.21) (0.94) (6.65)
Rumanian conc. 0.04 0.47 8.16
(0.11) (0.97) (6.04)
Chilean conc. 0.02 0.40 10.96
(0.05) (1.31) (11.97)
Bosnian-Herz. conc. 0.03 0.48 8.00
(0.34) (2.42) (7.30)
Serbia-Monte. conc. 00 0
(0) (0) (0)
Croatian conc. 0.03 0.52 6.85
(0.18) (3.85) (12.10)
Macedonian conc. 00 0
(0) (0) (0)
Slovenian conc. 0 0.76 0
(0) (8.70) (0)
Yugoslavian conc. 0.02 0.40 11.14
(0.07) (1.11) (20.02)
No. of municipalities 139 132 4
Source: Time-series municipality data from Statistics Denmark and the Immigrant Data Set.5.3 Determinants of subsequent migration
The descriptive evidence presented indicates a potentially important push
factor for placed refugees: lack of a large urban area. In order to test the
importance of that and other potential push factors in refugees’ migration
decision according to the hypotheses presented in Section 3, I include a whole
range of characteristics of the municipality of assignment and demographic
and lagged socioeconomic characteristics of the individual as explanatory
variables in the model to be estimated.
Location characteristics of the municipality of placement include the re-
gional unemployment rate and the share of jobs in the county situated in
the municipality of placement.8 As a proxy for the extent to which the local
government requires social beneﬁt recipients among refugees to participate in
Active Labour Market participation, I include the share of right-wing votes
at the latest local election, deﬁned as the votes for the Conservative Party
and the Liberal Party in per cent of the total votes for the Conservative
Party, Liberal Party, Social Democratic Party and Socialist Peoples Party
in the belief that Active Labour Market participation is more prevalent in
right-wing dominated locations. These three variables are meant to capture
the most important regional economic factors in the migration decision.
To capture the potential importance of living near friends, family and fel-
low countrymen and of living near other immigrants due to ethnic network
eﬀects and/or preferences for ethnic goods, I include the percentage of the
total group of fellow countrymen in Denmark that lives in the municipal-
ity of placement, henceforth ethnic concentration, and the number of local
immigrants in percentage of the local population.9 In addition, the size cat-
egory of the municipality of placement, small, medium or large, is included
for two reasons. First, to allow for attainment of rural versus urban life
style preferences as a migration motive. Second, to capture the mechanics
of geographical size. The fact that I consider cross-municipal moves only
8The ’share of local county jobs’ variable has missing values for 1986-1992. I have
replaced the missing values by the 1993 values.
9Note that this measure of ethnic concentration has the weakness that it is invariant
to the ’size’ of the ethnic group, i.e. the ethnic concentration is equal to 100% both for
an individual without fellow countrymen in the host country and for individuals of large
ethnic groups who all live in the same municipality. Since the smaller ethnic groups are
excluded from the analysis and refugees included in the analysis arrived in the same year
as other individuals from that refugee-sending country, this should not be a problem in
the econometric estimations.
39and disregard intra-municipal housing mobility may imply a higher share of
movers among refugees placed in small municipalities rather than medium-
sized and notably larger municipalities, because more short-distance moves
may be included in moves out of small municipalities than moves out of
medium-sized or large municipalities.
I, furthermore, include the number of vocational and higher educational
institutions in the municipality of placement to test the importance of close-
ness to institutions which oﬀer a vocational or higher education.
The ﬁnal characteristic of the municipality of placement is the number of
public housing ﬂats in per cent of the total housing stock, since refugees have
the easiest access to this type of housing in Denmark. Lack of local public
housing may trigger migration of refugees with housing dissatisfaction.
The demographic characteristics of the refugees consist of sex, age, mar-
ital status, number of infants, number of children (aged 3-18), country of
origin, total stock of fellow countrymen in Denmark and year of immigration.
These variables control for diﬀerences in the initial settlement pattern and
diﬀerences in costs of and returns to migration across demographic groups of
refugees. One year lags of socioeconomic characteristics measured by years
of education obtained in Denmark, the employment status (employed or not)
and the annual taxable income level are used to control for diﬀerences in costs
and returns to migration across socioeconomic groups.10 The socioeconomic
variables are lagged to help ensure their exogeneity in the migration decision.
Finally, to capture a potentially important aspect of life cycle disruptions
for housing or location dissatisfaction an indicator for whether or not the
marital status has changed during the year is included.
Initial mean values of the variables are given in Tables A.3 and A.4 in
the Appendix, for all refugees and for movers and stayers separately.
10Unfortunately, the Immigrant Data Set lacks information on highest completed level
of education prior to immigration for the main part of immigrants. Furthermore, the
information registered for the remaining part of immigrants is uncertain. As a consequence,
no information on the highest educational level obtained prior to immigration is included
in the subsequent empirical estimations.
406 Estimation results and simulation
6.1 Estimation results
The determinants of time until exit from the municipality of placement for
refugees in Denmark subject to the dispersal policy in place from 1986 to
1998 are analysed using the MPH model speciﬁcation described in Section
4.2.1. In addition, for the same group of individuals the determinants of
time until exit from the municipality of placement to a small, medium-sized
and large municipality are analysed using the MPH competing risk model
presented in Section 4.2.2. The models are estimated separately for men and
women.
6.1.1 The MPH model
The estimation results of the MPH model are reported in Table 6.1.
41Table 6.1.A MPH model estimates for men and women, separately. De-
pendent variable: overall hazard rate of move out of placement municipality.
Men Women
Covariates Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err.
Age/100 -0.924 0.764 -0.818 0.904
Age/100 squared -0.867 0.984 -0.485 1.149
Married -0.075*** 0.028 -0.214*** 0.037
Marital status change 0.328*** 0.044 0.702*** 0.063
# children 0-2 /10 -1.185*** 0.238 -0.815*** 0.259
# children 3-17 /10 -1.073*** 0.108 -0.773*** 0.120
Poland -0.171** 0.082 -0.684*** 0.067
Iraq -0.060 0.053 0.057 0.072
Vietnam -0.898*** 0.063 -0.860*** 0.072
Sri Lanka -0.807*** 0.048 -1.440*** 0.071
No citizenship -0.039 0.036 -0.038 0.050
Ethiopia -0.065 0.124 -0.419 0.181
Afghanistan -0.285*** 0.102 -0.167 0.131
Somalia 0.142** 0.064 0.113 0.081
Rumania -0.933*** 0.127 -0.610*** 0.127
Chile -0.387* 0.205 -0.703*** 0.273
Bosnia-Herzegovina -0.630*** 0.069 -0.398*** 0.081
Ex-Yugoslavia -0.611* 0.086 -0.536*** 0.106
Ethnic stock/105 -0.442*** 0.061 -0.344*** 0.079
Years educ. lag/10 0.253 0.316 -0.222 0.479
Job lagged 0.008 0.040 0.084 0.062
log(income) lag/10 -0.228*** 0.035 -0.273*** 0.043
Immigrat. year: 1985 -0.183*** 0.072 0.210** 0.104
Immigrat. year: 1986 -0.160*** 0.060 0.225*** 0.075
Immigrat. year: 1987 -0.164*** 0.062 0.150** 0.073
Immigrat. year: 1988 -0.059 0.063 0.088 0.075
Immigrat. year: 1989 -0.035 0.060 0.289*** 0.071
Immigrat. year: 1991 -0.043 0.064 0.055 0.073
Immigrat. year: 1992 -0.210*** 0.066 0.022 0.078
Immigrat. year: 1993 -0.107 0.071 -0.067 0.086
Immigrat. year: 1994 -0.222*** 0.080 -0.194** 0.093
42Table 6.1.B MPH model estimates for men and women, separately. De-
pendent variable: overall hazard rate of move out of placement municipality.
Men Women
Covariate Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err.
Immigrat. year: 1995 -0.028 0.078 -0.036 0.093
Immigrat. year: 1996 -0.401*** 0.084 -0.262** 0.105
Greater Copenhagen 0.880*** 0.047 0.727*** 0.061
Medium municipality 0.284*** 0.066 0.501*** 0.091
Small municipality 0.769*** 0.079 0.925*** 0.108
%i m m i g r a n t s / 1 0 -0.369*** 0.068 -0.444*** 0.089
Ethnic conc./10 -0.308*** 0.030 -0.354*** 0.038
Reg. unemp. rate/10 0.112** 0.056 0.288*** 0.074
% of county jobs/100 0.191 0.225 0.475 0.297
# educ. institut./100 -1.849*** 0.685 -0.314 0.906
% public housing/100 -2.236*** 0.141 -3.138*** 0.195
% right-wing votes/100 0.181* 0.105 0.327** 0.151
Baseline haz. funct.:
h1 -2.617*** 0.436 -2.455*** 0.655
h2 -1.955*** 0.436 -2.117*** 0.655
h3 -2.413*** 0.430 -2.363*** 0.644
h4 -2.045*** 0.431 -2.096*** 0.644
h5 -2.549*** 0.432 -2.473*** 0.647
h6 -2.744*** 0.439 -2.722*** 0.655
Mixing distribution:
v2 -1.016*** 0.049 -1.235*** 0.057
p1=Pr(v = v
1) 0.156*** 0.003 0.156*** 0.003
p2=Pr(v = v
2) 0.844*** 0.167 0.844*** 0.176
Number of movers 10,095 5,913
Number of observations 25,674 22,228
Number of cases 100,717 91,320
Log Likelihood -52,939.4 -33,740.0
Note: The asterisks, *, ** and ***, denote that the estimate is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Reference groups: 1. Nationality: Iran, 2. Year of immigration: 1990, 3.
Municipality size: large. Also controlled for missing values of the variables ’years
educ. lag’, ’job lagged’, ’log(income) lag’ and ’ethnic conc.’. The latter variable
had missing values for only 0.3% of the cases.
43The estimated hazard functions for men and women are plotted in Figures
6.1-6.2. The shape shows the duration dependence pattern. Interestingly, the
estimated piecewise constant baseline hazard function exhibits ﬁrst positive
and then negative duration dependence. Hence, the hazard rate of out-
migration from the municipality of placement increases during the ﬁrst years
after arrival to Denmark and declines thereafter. Note the similarity to the
Jovanovich (1979) matching model. Following that analogy, refugees spend
some months collecting information about the location of placement and
learning about the ’match quality’, and then move away if the location is
unsatisfactory. In addition, the housing oﬀe ra r r i v a lr a t ei sl i k e l yt ob ev e r y
low initially due to lack of knowledge of the host-country housing market,
to lack of savings and to lack of a personal network needed for access to
housing outside the public housing sector. However, note that the peaks of
the baseline hazard function in the intervals 7-12 and 19-24 are at least in
part a statistical artifact arising from the fact that the Immigrant Data Set
only contain information about the last change of address in each year for
each individual, see footnote in Section 4.2.1. In addition, the peaks may
in part be due to refugees waiting to move until the end of the introduction
programme which in general lasted for 18 months.
44Figure 6.1
Figure 6.2
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Estimated hazard functions for women 



















































High value of v
Low value of vThe parameter estimates are interpreted as follows. The eﬀect of a change
in a given characteristic of the individual of size ∆ on the hazard rate of
migration is given by the multiplicative eﬀect
Exp(β ∗ covariate scale factor∗∆X) (22)
T a b l e6 . 2T h em u l t i p l i c a t i v ee ﬀect of selected characteristics on the overall
hazard rate of migration.
Men Women
Location characteristics:
Greater Copenhagen area 2.41 2.07
Medium municipality 1.33 1.65
Small municipality 2.16 2.52
% immigrants: 1% point decrease 1.04 1.04
Ethnic conc.: 1% point decrease 1.03 1.04
Reg. unempl. rate: 1% point increase 1.01 1.03
% of county jobs: 1% point increase 11
# educ. institutions: Decrease by 1 1.02 1
% public housing: 1% point decrease 1.02 1.03
% right-wing votes: 1% point increase 1.002 1.003
Socioeconomic characteristics:
Years educ. lag: Increase of 1 11
Job lagged 11
Log(tax. income): 1% point decrease 1.02 1.03
Life cycle disruption:
Change in marital status 1.39 2.02
Note: A variable which was found to have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect in Table 6.1
has a multiplicative eﬀect on the hazard rate of 1, i.e. the hazard rate does not
change in spite of a change in the covariate.
The multiplicative eﬀects of small changes in location characteristics and
in socio-economic characteristics of the individual are presented in Table 6.2.
In contrast, the multiplicative eﬀects of demographic characteritics of the
individual are not presented. The reason is that one should be careful when
interpreting their estimated coeﬃcients because they may result from dif-
ferences in the extent to which refugees were able to inﬂuence their initial
46location rather than from diﬀerences in location preferences and/or costs of
moving between groups. The table shows that settlement in the Greater
Copenhagen area versus outside that area implies around twice as large exit
rate from the municipality of placement. The covariate probably captures
the high rates of relocation within the Greater Copenhagen area evident from
Table 5.2. The exit rate is signiﬁcantly increasing in the size of municipality
of placement. Initial settlement in a small municipality rather than a large
municipality (the reference group) increases the exit rate by 116% for men
and 152% for women, while initial settlement in a medium municipality ver-
sus a large municipality increases the exit rate by 33% for men and 65% for
women. Hence, municipality size appears to be an important push factor in
placed refugees migration decision. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that attainment of
urban lifestyle preferences is a possible migration motive of placed refugees.
The population composition is seen to be another signiﬁcant determinant
in the migration decision. For men and women alike, a percentage point
decrease in the percentage of immigrants in the local population implies 4%
increase of the exit rate. Similarly, a percentage point decrease in ethnic
concentration in the municipality of placement increases the exit rate by 3%
for men and 4% for women. These results conﬁrm that immigrant and ethnic
networks are important determinants of refugees’ place utility. These ﬁndings
conform with all previous studies on immigrants’ location preferences.
Turning to the economic migration motives, a high regional unemploy-
ment rate signiﬁcantly increases the exit rate. In particular, a percentage
p o i n ti n c r e a s ei nt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei n c r e a s e st h ee x i tr a t eb y1 %f o r
men and 3% women. Hence, female refugees surprisingly appear to be more
sensitive to diﬀerences in regional unemployment than male refugees. In a
related study on determinants of employment of male refugees, Damm and
Rosholm (2003) estimate that an percentage point increase in the regional
unemployment rate corresponds to a 2.6% decrease in the exit rate from non-
employment to employment. It is therefore fortunate that refugees react to
high regional unemployment by moving away. The results support the US
ﬁndings in Jaeger (2000) and Swedish ﬁndings in Åslund (2001) that immi-
grants’ location choice is sensitive to regional diﬀerences in unemployment
rates.
In contrast, residence in a municipality with a low share of the overall
number of jobs in the county is estimated to have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect
the hazard rate of migration. This could be interpreted as evidence against
the hypothesis that unfavourable local employment prospects tend to push
47refugees out of the municipality of placement. Alternatively, a municipality’s
share of the overall number of jobs in the county may be an unimportant
factor in refugees’ internal migration decision, because residence outside a
municipality with a large share of county jobs can be compensated for by
commuting.
The share of right-wing votes at the latest local election has a small,
but signiﬁcant eﬀect on the hazard rates. A percentage point increase in
the percentage of right-wing votes increases the exit rate by 0.2% and 0.3%
for men and women, respectively. This may indicate that some refugees
ﬂee municipalities which require social beneﬁts recipients among refugees
to participate relatively more in Active Labour Market training than other
municipalities. However, other interpretations are certainly possible.
For male refugees only, living near vocational and higher educational in-
stitutions is seen to be another important determinant of migration. Specif-
ically, one less local institution implies a 2% increase in the hazard rate of
migration for men.
Finally, the signiﬁcant eﬀect of the percentage of public housing provides
evidence that some migration away from the municipality of placement is
carried out for housing dissatisfaction reasons. Speciﬁcally, a percentage
point decrease in the percentage of public housing in the local housing stock
implies a 2-3% increase in the hazard rate of migration both for men and
women. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that access to public housing is important for
the ability of refugees to adjust their housing consumption.
Turning to the eﬀects of lagged socio-economic factors, the only impor-
tant factor in the migration decision is seen to be the annual taxable income.
The eﬀect of a percentage point decrease in log annual taxable income11 cor-
responds to an increase in the hazard rate of migration by 2-3%. A likely
explanation is that adjustment of housing consumption in order to obtain
a lower rent which may involve a move to the adjacent municipality is an-
other motive for moving away from the municipality of placement. A likely
reason for which educational level was found to have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect
on the hazard rate of migration is that the statistical estimations only in-
c l u d e di n f o r m a t i o no ne d u c a t i o no b t a ined in Denmark and no information
on education obtained prior to immigration to Denmark.
Note also the sizable eﬀect of a change in marital status. A change in
11For instance, an increase from DKK 108,000 to DKK 121,300 or from USD 16,564 to
USD 18,661.
48marital status increases the hazard rate of migration by 39% for men and
102% for women. The migration motive may in part be due to housing
consumption adjustment and in part to a change in life style preferences.
Finally, the estimated mixing distribution conﬁrms that placed refugees’
decision of whether or not to move away from the municipality of place-
ment is also inﬂuenced by unobserved characteristics of the individuals. For
both men and women the estimates show signiﬁcant evidence of unobservable
characteristics of individuals which are correlated with individuals’ migration
propensity. The estimates of the probability distribution of the combinations
of unobserved heterogeneity across destinations show that 15.6% of male and
female refugees alike have unobservable characteristics that imply a relatively
high migration propensity relative to the remaining 84.4% of the refugees.
Furthermore, due to diﬀerences in unobserved characteristics, the hazard
rate of migration of the latter group of refugees is estimated to amount to
only 36.2% of that of the former group of refugees. Examples of unobserved
characteristics of potential importance for the migration propensity include
abilities of the individual, education from the country of origin and whether
or not the individual is placed within commuting distance of close family
and friends in the host country. Failure to take unobserved heterogeneity
into account would have resulted in a downward biased estimate of dura-
tion dependence, due to increasing selection over time as individuals with a
low migration propensity due to unobservable characteristics constitute an
increasingly high share of the risk set (Lancaster 1990).
6.1.2 The MPH competing risks model
The estimation results of the MPH competing risks model are reported for
men and women separately in Tables 6.3 and Tables 6.4, respectively.
49Table 6.3.A MPH competing risks model estimates for men. Dependent
variable: destination-speciﬁc hazard rate of move out of placement munici-
pality.
Destination Small Medium Large
Covariates Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err.
Age/100 -1.142 2.799 0.177 1.013 -0.207 1.280
Age/100 squared -0.481 3.724 -1.608 1.298 -2.774* 1.663
Married -0.344*** 0.097 -0.084** 0.038 -0.043 0.044
Marital status change 0.227 0.164 0.386*** 0.059 0.256*** 0.068
# children 0-2 /10 -1.142 0.899 -0.707** 0.330 -1.661*** 0.387
# children 3-17 /10 -0.566 0.424 -0.490*** 0.142 -2.124*** 0.185
Poland 0.957*** 0.260 -0.159 0.113 -0.477*** 0.147
Iraq -0.800*** 0.283 -0.097 0.073 0.119 0.087
Vietnam -0.596** 0.275 -0.623*** 0.087 -1.107*** 0.101
Sri Lanka 0.592*** 0.180 -0.431*** 0.063 -2.529*** 0.122
No citizenship 0.124 0.158 0.003 0.050 -0.108** 0.055
Ethiopia -0.218 0.560 -0.131 0.170 -0.077 0.207
Afghanistan -0.410 0.575 -0.160 0.133 -0.112 0.177
Somalia 0.545** 0.267 -0.056 0.092 0.424*** 0.103
Rumania -0.356 0.482 -0.555*** 0.162 -1.458*** 0.249
Chile -0.105 0.886 -0.368 0.258 -0.454 0.442
Bosnia-Herzegovina -0.437 0.275 -0.111 0.096 -1.614*** 0.120
Ex-Yugoslavia -0.111 0.303 -0.191* 0.113 -1.451*** 0.178
Ethnic stock/105 -0.499* 0.291 -0.470*** 0.082 -0.298*** 0.105
Years educ. lag/10 -0.676 1.845 0.956** 0.432 0.226 0.498
Job lagged 0.441*** 0.131 0.190*** 0.057 -0.336*** 0.066
log(income) lag/10 -0.253* 0.133 -0.374*** 0.048 -0.021 0.057
Immigrat. year: 1985 0.599* 0.355 -0.050 0.100 -0.231** 0.114
Immigrat. year: 1986 0.645** 0.316 -0.079 0.082 -0.163* 0.093
Immigrat. year: 1987 0.206 0.327 -0.080 0.084 -0.125 0.094
Immigrat. year: 1988 0.451 0.339 0.032 0.085 -0.112 0.094
Immigrat. year: 1989 0.559* 0.323 -0.019 0.083 -0.024 0.089
Immigrat. year: 1991 -0.440 0.394 0.026 0.087 -0.050 0.095
50Table 6.3.B MPH competing risks model estimates for men. Dependent
variable: destination-speciﬁc hazard rate of move out of placement munici-
pality.
Destination Small Medium Large
Covariate Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err.
Immigrat. year: 1992 0.107 0.356 -0.199** 0.092 -0.222** 0.098
Immigrat. year: 1993 -0.063 0.394 -0.090 0.099 -0.120 0.104
Immigrat. year: 1994 0.709* 0.372 -0.319*** 0.118 -0.168 0.125
Immigrat. year: 1995 0.967*** 0.356 -0.151 0.107 0.109 0.125
Immigrat. year: 1996 0.773** 0.389 -0.557*** 0.115 -0.288** 0.144
Greater Copenhagen -0.067 0.271 0.877*** 0.070 0.614*** 0.073
Medium municipality 0.141 0.270 0.156 0.098 0.114 0.100
Small municipality 0.522* 0.306 0.711*** 0.116 0.327*** 0.124
%i m m i g r a n t s / 1 0 -0.304 0.317 0.002 0.097 -0.655*** 0.108
Ethnic conc./10 -0.218* 0.129 -0.183*** 0.036 -0.736*** 0.084
Reg. unemp. rate/10 0.221 0.223 -0.172** 0.077 0.682*** 0.092
% of county jobs/100 -0.692 0.946 1.647*** 0.316 -1.048*** 0.383
# educ. institut./100 1.122 2.721 -5.163*** 0.970 -1.439 1.123
% public housing/100 -3.903*** 0.600 -3.854*** 0.200 0.301 0.240
% right-wing votes/100 -0.763** 0.341 0.472*** 0.151 0.531*** 0.184
Baseline haz. funct.:
h1 -4.746** 2.230 -4.247*** 0.602 -4.968*** 0.696
h2 -3.828* 2.257 -3.619*** 0.601 -4.216*** 0.694
h3 -4.275* 2.211 -3.996*** 0.593 -4.674*** 0.687
h4 -4.122* 2.217 -3.740*** 0.594 -4.050*** 0.683
h5 -4.483** 2.226 -4.414*** 0.596 -4.410*** 0.685
h6 -5.072** 2.244 -4.699*** 0.606 -4.489*** 0.698
51Table 6.3.C MPH competing risks model estimates for men. Dependent
variable: destination-speciﬁc hazard rate of move out of placement munici-
pality.















































Number of observations 25,674
Number of cases 100,717
Log Likelihood -60,485.19
Note: The asterisks, *, ** and ***, denote that the estimate is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Number of movers to each destination: small: 781, medium-sized: 5,574 and
large: 3,740.
Reference groups: 1. Nationality: Iran, 2. Year of immigration: 1990, 3.
Municipality size: large. Also controlled for missing values of the variables ’years
educ. lag’, ’job lagged’, ’log(income) lag’ and ’ethnic conc.’. The latter variable
had missing values for only 0.36% of the cases.
52Table 6.4.A MPH competing risks model estimates for women. Dependent
variable: destination-speciﬁc hazard rate of move out of placement munici-
pality.
Destination Small Medium Large
Covariates Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err.
Age/100 -1.137 4.233 -0.368 1.195 -2.561* 1.495
Age/100 squared -0.206 5.436 -0.466 1.519 0.826 1.899
Married -0.167 0.170 -0.243*** 0.049 -0.143** 0.061
Marital status change 0.823** 0.261 0.814*** 0.083 0.487*** 0.107
# children 0-2 /10 -1.562 1.127 -0.263 0.356 -1.451*** 0.409
# children 3-17 /10 0.095 0.515 -0.295* 0.165 -1.504*** 0.196
Poland 0.428 0.278 -0.530*** 0.091 -1.231*** 0.129
Iraq -0.505 0.486 0.186* 0.100 0.286** 0.121
Vietnam -0.463 0.372 -0.482*** 0.099 -1.103*** 0.115
Sri Lanka -0.114 0.299 -0.829*** 0.091 -2.881*** 0.175
No citizenship 0.209 0.251 -0.041 0.071 -0.161** 0.078
Ethiopia -1.381 1.146 -0.009 0.233 -0.356 0.292
Afghanistan -0.172 0.813 0.469*** 0.170 -0.478* 0.267
Somalia 0.382 0.441 0.118 0.114 0.485*** 0.133
Rumania -0.026 0.619 -0.117 0.166 -0.857*** 0.233
Chile -0.325 1.221 -0.545 0.380 0.085 0.436
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.331 0.416 0.142 0.112 -1.649*** 0.137
Ex-Yugoslavia -0.360 0.525 0.135 0.136 -1.488*** 0.223
Ethnic stock/105 -1.482 4.045 -1.733* 1.059 -0.407 1.451
Years educ. lag/10 -1.586 2.969 -0.061 0.602 0.800 1.028
Job lagged 0.466** 0.210 0.327*** 0.080 -0.414*** 0.116
log(income) lag/10 -0.152 0.187 -0.384*** 0.061 -0.157** 0.069
Immigrat. year: 1985 -0.139 0.560 0.458*** 0.140 0.140 0.165
Immigrat. year: 1986 0.649* 0.350 0.380*** 0.103 0.143 0.121
Immigrat. year:: 1987 0.585* 0.344 0.195* 0.100 0.149 0.116
Immigrat. year:: 1988 0.630* 0.347 0.241** 0.103 -0.167 0.119
Immigrat. year: 1989 0.424 0.350 0.388*** 0.097 0.159 0.105
Immigrat. year: 1991 -0.081 0.391 0.071 0.104 0.004 0.104
53Table 6.4.B MPH competing risks model estimates for women. Dependent
variable: destination-speciﬁc hazard rate of move out of placement munici-
pality.
Destination Small Medium Large
Covariate Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err.
Immigrat. year: 1992 0.046 0.374 0.082 0.108 -0.163 0.112
Immigrat. year: 1993 -0.510 0.493 -0.080 0.121 -0.156 0.125
Immigrat. year: 1994 -0.378 0.533 -0.500*** 0.134 -0.073 0.138
Immigrat. year: 1995 0.100 0.451 -0.257** 0.130 -0.015 0.146
Immigrat. year: 1996 0.181 0.491 -0.612*** 0.144 -0.265 0.173
Greater Copenhagen 0.425 0.297 0.875*** 0.088 0.246*** 0.092
Medium municipality 0.336 0.400 0.326** 0.136 0.117 0.136
Small municipality 0.618 0.465 0.906*** 0.158 0.114 0.173
%i m m i g r a n t s / 1 0 -0.781* 0.406 -0.180 0.124 -0.600*** 0.141
Ethnic conc./10 -0.266 0.205 -0.244*** 0.045 -0.858*** 0.110
Reg. unemp. rate/10 0.467 0.317 0.016 0.098 0.741*** 0.124
% of county jobs/100 -1.163 1.302 2.105*** 0.414 -1.026** 0.485
# educ. institut/100 2.383 3.751 -4.300*** 1.285 0.072 1.399
% public housing/100 -2.929*** 0.868 -4.908*** 0.272 -0.420 0.336
% right-wing votes/100 -0.153 0.650 0.439** 0.204 0.579** 0.253
Baseline haz. funct.:
h1 -4.019 3.749 -3.200*** 0.854 -5.348*** 1.293
h2 -3.567 3.743 -2.939*** 0.853 -4.908*** 1.292
h3 -4.792 3.707 -3.179*** 0.835 -5.057*** 1.282
h4 -4.503 3.714 -3.005*** 0.834 -4.656*** 1.283
h5 -4.900 3.705 -3.577*** 0.838 -4.872*** 1.285
h6 -5.097 3.735 -3.822*** 0.849 -5.253*** 1.298
54Table 6.4.C MPH competing risks model estimates for women. Dependent
variable: destination-speciﬁc hazard rate of move out of placement munici-
pality.















































Number of observations 22,228
Number of cases 91,320
Log Likelihood -37,936.34
Note: The asterisks, *, ** and ***, denote that the estimate is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Number of movers to each destination: small: 369, medium-sized: 3,363 and
large: 2,181.
Reference groups: 1. Nationality: Iran, 2. Year of immigration: 1990, 3.
Municipality size: large. Also controlled for missing values of the variables ’years
educ. lag’, ’job lagged’, ’log(income) lag’ and ’ethnic conc.’. The latter variable
had missing values for only 0.24% of the cases.
The estimated destination-speciﬁc hazard functions are plotted in Fig-
ures 6.3-6.4. The duration dependence pattern of the overall hazard rate
of migration carries over to the destination-speciﬁc hazard functions. They
exhibit ﬁrst positive, then negative duration dependence. Hence, the proba-
bility to migrate out the municipality of placement to any of the three types
of destination increases during the ﬁrst years after arrival to Denmark and
declines thereafter, although not signiﬁcantly.
55Figure 6.3
Figure 6.4
Estimated destination-specific hazard functions for 
men 
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SmallTable 6.5 The multiplicative eﬀect of selected characteristics on the destination-
speciﬁc hazard rates.
Men Women
Destination Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Location characteristics:
Greater Copenhagen area 12 . 4 0 1 . 8 5 1 2.40 1.27
Medium municipality 11 111 . 3 8 1
Small municipality 1.69 2.04 1.39 12 . 4 7 1
%i m m i g r a n t s :
1% point decrease 11 1 . 0 7 1.08 1 1.06
Ethnic conc.:
1% point decrease 1.02 1.02 1.08 1 1.02 1.09
Regional unempl. rate:
1% point increase 10 . 9 8 1 . 0 7 1 1 1.08
%o fc o u n t yj o b s :
1% point increase 10 . 9 8 1 . 0 1 1 0.98 1.01
# educ. institutions:
Decrease by 1 11 . 0 5 111 . 0 4 1
% public housing:
1% point decrease 1.04 1.04 1 1.03 1.05 1
% right-wing votes:
1% point increase 0.99 1.01 1.01 1 1.01 1.01
Soc.-econ. characteristics:
Years of education lagged:
Increase of 1 11 . 1 0 111 1
Job lagged 1.55 1.21 0.71 1.59 1.39 0.66
Log of taxable income:
1% point decrease 1.02 1.04 1 1 1.04 1.02
Life cycle disruption:
Change in marital status 11 . 4 7 1 . 2 9 2.28 2.26 1.63
Note: A variable which was found to have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect in Table 6.3
or 6.4 has a multiplicative eﬀect on the destination-speciﬁc hazard rate of 1, i.e.
the hazard rate does not change in spite of a change in the covariate.
The multiplicative eﬀects of small changes in location characteristics and
in socio-economic characteristics of the individual are presented in Table 6.5.
57Interestingly, most of these characteristics are found to aﬀect the choice of
destination, given that a move is carried out. Furthermore, the estimated
eﬀects are largely the same for men and women.
The table shows that settlement in the Greater Copenhagen area versus
outside that area implies around twice as large exit rates to medium and
large municipalities. The covariate probably captures the high rates of relo-
cation within the Greater Copenhagen area evident from Table 5.2. Initial
settlement in a small municipality versus a large (the reference group) sig-
niﬁcantly increases the exit rate to a medium municipality, by 104% for men
and 147% for women. For men, initial settlement in a small municipality
also signiﬁcantly increases the exit rate to a large or another small munic-
ipality, but the eﬀects are much smaller. Initial settlement in a medium
versus a large municipality has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect except for exit to an-
other medium municipality for women. These ﬁndings show that medium
rather than large municipalities are especially able to attract refugees from
small municipalities. This migration pattern may be a realisation of the phe-
nomenon of step-migration noted by Ravenstein (1885, 1889). Furthermore,
judging from Table 5.2 medium-sized municipalities which exert a pull ef-
fect on refugees from small municipalities tend to be situated in the Greater
Copenhagen area. Therefore, the ﬁndings do not contradict the hypothesis
that refugees are attracted to large, urban areas.
The population composition is seen to be another signiﬁcant determinant
of the choice of destination in the migration decision. For men and women
alike, a percentage point decrease in the percentage of immigrants in the
local population implies 6-7% increase of the exit rate to large municipali-
ties where other immigrants tend to live. Somewhat surprisingly, for women
it also increases the exit rate to small municipalities. Lack of presence of
fellow contrymen signiﬁcantly increases the exit rate to any destination for
men and to medium and large municipalities for women. This ﬁnding is un-
derstandable in view of the Dispersal Policy under which the larger refugee
groups tended to be dispersed in big clusters of the same ethnic origin across
counties and within these counties mainly across medium-sized municipali-
ties. Speciﬁcally, a percentage point decrease in ethnic concentration in the
municipality of placement increases the exit rate to a medium municipality
by 2% and to a large municipality by 7-8% for both men and women.
Turning to the economic migration motives, a high regional unemploy-
ment rate signiﬁcantly increases the exit rate to large municipalities while for
men it also decreases the exit rate to medium municipalities. In particular, a
58percentage point increase in the unemployment rate increases the former exit
rate by 7% for men and women alike and decreases the latter exit rate by
2%. From a labour market integration perspective this ﬁnding is unfortunate
since the larger municipalities in Denmark were characterised by relatively
high regional unemployment rates in the period of observation, see for in-
stance Table 5.10. Turning to the eﬀect of residence in a municipality with
a low share of the overall number of jobs in the county, recall that it had
an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the overall hazard rate. In contrast, such residence
characteristic signiﬁcantly increases the exit rate to large municipalities for
men and decreases the exit rate to medium-sized municipalites. Hence, these
ﬁndings show that unfavourable economic factors tend to trigger migration
to the larger municipalities and reduce the exit rate to medium-sized munic-
ipalities.
The share of right-wing votes at the latest local election has a small,
but signiﬁcant eﬀect on the destination-speciﬁc hazard rates. A percentage
p o i n ti n c r e a s ei nt h ep e r c e n t a g eo fr i g h t - w i n gv o t e si n c r e a s e st h ee x i tr a t e s
to medium and large municipalities by 1%. These choices of destination
seem rational since medium-sized and especially large municipalities were
characterised by a relatively low share of right-wing votes in the period of
observation, see for instance Table 5.10.
Recall that lack of local vocational and higher educational institutions
was found to aﬀect the overall hazard rate of migration for men only. In
contrast, the competing risks results show that lack of such local educational
institutions aﬀects the hazard rate of migration towards medium-sized mu-
nicipalities for men and women alike. Speciﬁcally, one less local institution
implies a 4-5% increase of the hazard rate to medium-sized municipalities
both for men and women. Hence, attainment of educational needs appear
to be another motive among placed refugees for moving to medium-sized
municipalities.
Finally, the signiﬁcant estimate of the eﬀect of the percentage of public
housing on the hazard rate of migration to small and medium-sized munici-
palities provides empirical evidence that migration towards these destinations
of placed refugees occur partly for housing dissatisfaction reasons. The eﬀects
are large; a percentage point decrease in the percentage of public housing in
the local housing stock implies a 3-5% increase in the exit rates to small and
medium municipalities both for men and women.
T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬀects of lagged socio-economic factors, the competing
risk model gives us further insights relative to the single risk model for which
59only the log annual taxable income was found to aﬀect the hazard rate of
migration signiﬁcantly. In the competing risk model the eﬀect of a percent-
age point decrease in log annual taxable income corresponds to an increase
in the exit rate to a small or medium-sized municipality by 2-4% for men
and an increase in the exit rate to a medium-sized or large municipality of
similar magnitude for women. However, whether or not an individual was
employed in November of the previous year is seen to be a more important
socioeconomic factor with respect to choice of destination in the migration
decision. Employment signiﬁcantly reduces the exit rate to large munici-
palities, by 29% for men and 34% for women. In contrast, being employed
increases the exit rate to small municipalities by around 55-59% for both men
and women and to medium-sized municipalities by 21% for men and 39% for
women. A likely interpretation is that having a job reduces the returns to
immigrant and ethnic networks to be found in the larger urban areas. An
additional year of Danish education increases the exit rate to medium-sized
municipalities by 10% for men. This result is similar to the result found by
Bartel (1989) that higher educated immigrants in the US have higher rates
of migration away from the large SMSAs than lower educated immigrants.
However, recall that the statistical estimations in the present study does not
take education obtained prior to immigration into account due to lack of
availability of high quality data on this issue in the Immigrant Data Set.
Finally, note the sizable eﬀect of a change in marital status which in-
creases the hazard of exit to all destinations except to small municipalities
for men. The migration motive may in part be due to housing consumption
adjustment and in part to a change in life style preferences.
The estimated mixing distribution conﬁrms that some of the observed
migration pattern is ’explained’ by unobserved characteristics of the indi-
viduals. For both men and women the estimates show signiﬁcant evidence
of unobservable characteristics of individuals which are correlated with indi-
viduals’ migration propensity to medium-sized and large municipalities. In
contrast, no unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the migration propen-
sity to small municipalities is detected, probably due to the relatively small
number of relocations to small municipalities observed in the data. The
estimates of the probability distribution of the combinations of unobserved
heterogeneity across destinations show that 27% of male refugees have un-
observable characteristics that imply a relatively high migration propensity
to small municipalities and a relatively low migration propensity to medium
and large municipalities. The remaining seven probabilities were insignif-
60icant. Similarly, 40% of female refugees were found to have unobservable
characteristics which implied a relatively low migration propensity to small
and medium municipalities, but a relatively high migration propensity to
large municipalities. Again, the remaining seven probabilities were insignif-
icant. Examples of unobserved characteristics of potential importance for
the migration propensity and choice of destination include abilities of the
individual, education from the country of origin, life-style preferences of the
individual (i.e. urban or rural life-style, religious convictions) and ﬁnally the
location of close family and friends in the host country.
6.2 Model simulation
The estimated MPH model of the hazard rate of migration implies the follow-
ing in terms of the predicted mean duration of the municipality of placement
spell. The predicted mean duration for a person with observed characteristics






















where ’∞’ is replaced by a suitable large ﬁnite number. In the calculations
below, ’∞’ is replaced by 600 months, i.e. 50 years. The predicted hazard
rate is assumed to be constant from month 156 and onwards (out-of sample
prediction).
Table 6.6 illustrates the eﬀect of changes in selected location and socio-
economic characteristics on the predicted mean duration until migration for a
male refugee with mean characteristics who has favourable unobserved char-
acteristics with sample probability
ˆ
p1 = 0.156 and unfavourable unobserved
characteristics with sample probability
ˆ
p2 = 0.844. This reference person
is an artiﬁcial construct but the person approximately has the following ob-
served characteristics. He is 34 years old, married, has no children, originates
61from Lebanon but has no citizenship, has 9,700 fellow countrymen in Den-
mark, immigrated in 1986, has missing value for years of Danish education,
was employed with probability one to ﬁve in November the previous year,
had an annual income before taxes of DKK 51,000 (approx. USD 7,850)
the previous year. The reference person is placed in a municipality with the
following characteristics: medium-sized, situated outside the Greater Copen-
hagen area, immigrants constitute 5.8% of the local population, 5.8% of his
ethnic group in Denmark lives here, the regional unemployment rate is 9.6%,
27% of the county jobs are situated here, it has 10 vocational or higher ed-
ucational institutions, public housing constitutes 22% of the housing stock,
and ﬁnally 41% of the votes at the latest local election went to right-wing
political parties. Such a reference person has a predicted mean duration until
migration of 150.1 months. Hence, the model predicts that this individual
will stay 12.5 years in the municipality of placement.
The interpretation of the model simulation results presented in Table 6.6
is as follows. The ﬁrst row of simulation results shows that had this average
individual instead started his residential career within the Greater Copen-
hagen area or in a small rather than a medium municipality, he would have
moved to another municipality much sooner, in fact 92.1 or 84.2 months
earlier. In contrast, the predicted mean duration until migration for this
individual is not very sensitive to marginal changes in any other location
characteristic.A rather large percentage point change in the other location
characteristic is required for the change to induce a fast move. For instance,
a four percentage points decrease in the percentage of immigrants only re-
duces the predicted mean duration until migration for this individual by 20.3
months. Hence, especially the location of the municipality of placement rel-
ative to Copenhagen and the number of inhabitants are seen to have a large
impact on the predicted mean duration in the municipality of placement.
62Table 6.6 Size of selected eﬀects in terms of change in predicted mean
duration (months) until migration. Reference person: A male refugee with
mean values of observed characteristics and average type of unobserved char-
acteristics.
Change in predicted mean duration
Change in a single location characteristic:
Greater Copenhagen = 1 -92.1
Small = 1 -84.2
% immigrants: 4% points decrease -20.3
% ethnic conc: 4% points decrease -17.1
% reg. unemploym.: 3% points increase -4.8
% public housing: 15% points decrease -43.3
# of educ. institutions: Decrease by 9 -22.8
Change in several location characteristics:
Small = 1, % immigrants: -4% points
% ethnic conc.: -4% points,
%r e g .u n e m p l o y m . :+ 3 %p o i n t s ,
# educ. institut.: -9,
% public housing: -15% points -124.4
Note: Predicted mean duration until migration for reference person with favourable
and unfavourable unobserved characteristics, respectively: 55.5 and 167.6 months.
P r e d i c t e dm e a nd u r a t i o nu n t i lm i g r a t i o nf o rr e f e r e n c ep e r s o nw i t ha v e r a g et y p e
of unobserved characteristics: 0.156*55.5 months+0.844*167.6 months = 150.1
months.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This study presents descriptive evidence that the Danish Dispersal Policy
on refugees who immigrated between October 1985 and December 1996 gave
rise to a fairly equal initial geographical distribution of refugees at the county
level relative to the number of inhabitants in the county. At the end of 1998,
only 26% of the refugees had subsequently migrated to another county. The
migration ﬂows mainly went in the direction of the Greater Copenhagen area
and the second most populated county in Denmark, Århus.
The Danish Dispersal Policy also aimed at an equal distribution of refugees
across municipalities relative to the number of inhabitants in the municipal-
63ity. The descriptive evidence indicates that the Danish Dispersal Policy was
fairly successful in the short run but less so in the medium run. The out-
migration rates measured at the municipality level were 39% for male refugees
and 27% for female refugees. But out-migration rates for small municipalities
were much higher: 50% and 36% for male and female refugees, respectively.
On average, relocations were carried out 2 years after initial settlement, but
on average relocations out of small municipalities took place already after
18 months. Around 93% of the migration ﬂows went in the direction of
medium-sized or large municipalities. However, only large municipalities re-
ceived at net inﬂow of placed refugees, thereby increasing the existing ethnic
concentrations in the large cities.
To analyse refugees’ location preferences in depth, I ﬁrst investigated
the importance of potential push factors in placed refugees’ ﬁrst migration
decision, i.e. their decision about whether or not to move away from the
municipality of placement. To this end I estimated determinants of placed
refugees’ hazard rate of exit from the municipality of placement, using the
Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) functional form. I then proceeded to
investigation of the importance of potential push factors for migrants’ choice
of destination: small, medium-sized or large municipalities. In particular,
I estimated the determinants of the three destination-speciﬁc hazard rates,
placed refugees hazard rate of exit to a small, medium-sized or large munic-
ipality, again using the MPH functional form assumption. The estimates of
both MPH models, with and without competing risks, are unlikely to suf-
fer much from bias, because my examination of the implementation of the
Danish Dispersal Policy showed that around 90% of refugees were randomly
distributed across locations based on six individual characteristics of which
ﬁve were included as controls in the model estimations. In addition, unob-
served heterogeneity of the individuals is taken into account in both types of
models estimated.
The estimation results show that the higher the concentration of fellow
countrymen in the municipality of placement, the lower is the exit rate to
any of the three mutually exclusive types of destinations. A percentage
point decrease in the ethnic concentration increases the exit rate to large
municipalities by 8-9% and increases the exit rate to small or medium-sized
municipalities by 2%. Lack of an immigrant network and high regional unem-
ployment increase the hazard of exit to large municipalities. In particular, a
percentage point increase in the regional unemployment rate corresponds to a
7% increase in the exit rate to a large municipality for men and women alike.
64I n i t i a ls e t t l e m e n ti nas m a l lm u n i c i p a l i t ym o r et h a nd o u b l e st h ee x i tr a t et o
medium municipalities for both men and women; the eﬀect on the hazard
rate to small or large municipalities are considerably lower. Lack of local
public housing increases the exit rate to small and medium municipalities.
Turning to estimated correlation between socioeconomic characteristcs of
the individual and the exit rate from municipality of assignment, the results
show that the employment status of the individual is a really important factor
for the destination of migration. Individuals who were employed at the end
of the previous year were, ceteris paribus, much less likely to migrate to a
large municipality than those who were not and much more likely to migrate
to especially a small municipality. Moreover, being employed last year is
associated with an increase in the overall hazard rate of migration for a
male refugee with mean observed characteristics. Similarly, better educated
male refugees were more likely to migrate to medium-sized municipalities.
These correlations suggest that male stayers among placed refugees have
unfavourable labour market characteristics relative to male movers.
Turning to the duration aspects of the migrations, I ﬁnd very interesting
duration dependence results: Positive duration dependence during the ﬁrst
two years after placement and thereafter negative duration dependence. This
is likely to be an analog of the Jovanovich (1979) labour market matching
model in which workers and ﬁrms learn about the match quality over time.
In the present context, refugees spend a couple of years learning about the
match quality of the municipality of placement and themselves and then they
m o v ei ft h em a t c hq u a l i t yi sl o w .
What do the ﬁndings imply about the usefulness of dispersal policy for
avoiding an increased concentration of immigrants in already immigrant-
dense larger cities? On the one hand, the ﬁndings leave little hope that
dispersal policy is a useful instrument for increasing immigrant concentra-
tion in small urban and rural districts. Except for a regional unemployment
rate which on average was relatively low, small urban and rural districts typ-
ically do not have the location characteristics which induce placed refugees
to remain settled. On the other hand, the ﬁndings leave some hope that
dispersal policy can be used to increase geographical distribution of immi-
grants across regions in the country. Especially regions with a large urban
area, e.g. Århus and Funen, were seen to be relatively able to induce placed
refugees to stay in the region. If policy makers decide on a dispersal policy
for new refugees in order to increase the geographical distribution of immi-
grants, the dispersal ought to meet the following criteria. Refugees should be
65distributed in big clusters of individuals of the same ethnic origin and they
should be dispersed across urban areas which oﬀer favourable employment
opportunities, vocational and higher educations and suitable housing.
However, two important questions concerning dispersal policies remain
unanswered. First, are the secondary migration pattern of placed refugees
described in this study realisations of step-migration towards the larger ur-
ban areas? Second, do dispersal policies in fact facilitate the labour market
integration process of refugee immigrants due to increased interaction with
the majority population. Theoretical and empirical investigations of these
two questions are left to future research.
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Construction of variables
The following variables were constructed based on information from the
longitudinal administrative registers of Statistics Denmark on the immigrant
population in Denmark 1984-2001.
Years of education. This variable refers to total number of years of educa-
tion obtained in Denmark. The variable was constructed using information
about an individual’s highest completed education obtained in Denmark from
the registers which have extremely detailed education information; for edu-
cations lasting more than a year information is given both on the education
and the highest year of the education completed. Furthermore, the level of
the education can be inferred from the education code, because in general
the educational level is increasing in the code value. The codes therefore
allow us to construct a variable of years of education completed which takes
values 0.5 years (for pre-school class) to 17 years (for masters degrees).
log(income). This income variable refers to annual gross income of the
individual, i.e. the sum of all taxable income of the individual, including
income transfers.
Ethnic stock. The total number of immigrants from each of the 17 refugee
countries was obtained for every year 1986-1997. The ’ethnic stock’ variable
denotes the total number of immigrants from the refugee’s country of origin.
Ethnic concentration. This variable is constructed as a refugees’ number
of fellow countrymen in the municipality of residence in per cent of the total
number of immigrants from that country of origin.
%i m m i g r a n t s . The variable is calculated as the total number of im-
migrants residing in the municipality in per cent of the total number of
municipality inhabitants.
Greater Copenhagen. This indicator variable takes the value 1 if a refugee
lives in Copenhagen and Frederiksberg county municipalities or in Copen-
hagen county and 0 otherwise.
The following variables have been constructed using the annual time-series
data on municipality characteristics from Statistics Denmark’s website.
Small municipality. This indicator variable takes the value 1 if a refugee
lives in a municipality with less than or equal to 10,000 inhabitants, of which
there were approximately 139 out of the total of 275 Danish municipalities.
70Medium municipality. This indicator variable takes the value 1 if a refugee
lives in a municipality with more than 10,000 and less than or equal to 100,000
inhabitants. This includes approximately 132 Danish municipalities.
Large municipality. This indicator variable takes the value 1 if a refugee
lives in a municipality with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Only four Dan-
ish municipalities fall into this category: Copenhagen, Århus, Odense and
Ålborg.
% of county jobs. The variable gives the number of individuals employed
in the municipality of residence in per cent the total number of individuals
employed in the county. Administratively and politically, Denmark is divided
into14 counties and two so-called county municipalities.
# educational institutions. This variable includes 40 diﬀerent types of
institutions for vocational and higher education and denotes the number of
such institutions in the municipality of residence.
% public housing. The variable denotes the number of public housing
dwellings for all-year residence in the municipality of residence in per cent
of the total number of dwellings for all-year residence in the municipality of
residence.
%r i g h t - w i n gv o t e s .This variable is constructed as the sum of votes for
the Liberal Party and the Conservative People’s Party in per cent of the
sum of votes for the Liberal Party, the Conservative People’s Party, the
Socialdemocratic Party and the Socialist People’s Party at the latest local
election. The two former parties are traditional right-wing parties whereas
the latter two are traditional left-wing parties. Local elections take place
every four years.
Regional unemployment rate. This variable has been constructed by the
Institute of Local Government Studies based on information from the Min-
istry of Transport on the costs of transportation from the largest post oﬃce
in each municipality to each of the other 274 largest post oﬃces in the other
municipalities. The regional unemployment rate used in the present study
gives the unemployment rate in a radius of DKK 60 of transport around
the largest post oﬃce in the municipality of residence. DKK 60 correspond
to approximately USD 9.20. The information on unemployment stems from
Statistics Denmark’s 10% administrative register sample of the Danish pop-
ulation 1984-2001.
71Table A.1 Year of immigration and country of origin of individuals extracted
from the Immigrant Data Set to the Refugee Data Set (individuals aged 18-66).
Citizenship↓ Year−→ 1985* 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Europe: 128 455 524 544 252 127 0 0 0 243 10,792 2,877 15,942
Poland 113 425 487 505 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1530
R u m a n i a 1 5 3 03 73 92 5 2 1 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 9,952 1,487 11,467
S e r b i a - M o n t e n e g r o 0 0000000000 3 2 3 2
C r o a t i a 0 000000001 4 1 4 8 2 6 1 8 8
M a c e d o n i a 0 000000005 1 1 0 6 1 1 2 2 6 9
S l o v e n i a 0 0000000071 262 8
Y u g o s l a v i a 0 000000001 4 3 5 7 4 1 , 2 1 4 1 , 9 3 1
Africa: 17 93 70 32 199 158 436 490 871 763 854 1,280 5,263
Ethiopia 17 93 70 32 42 32 30 29 33 62 21 42 503
Somalia 0 0 0 0 157 126 406 461 838 701 833 1,238 4,760
Uganda
America: 10 21 29 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 87
C h i l e 1 0 2 1 2 9 2 7 0000000 08 7
Asia: 815 3,345 1,554 1,400 1,498 1,409 1,640 1,975 1,572 1,116 1,318 1,509 19,154
Afghanistan 13 36 16 20 34 44 101 71 89 109 128 174 835
Iraq 125 281 173 313 311 279 327 730 672 429 613 683 4,936
Iran 530 865 751 719 519 521 570 379 280 196 165 292 5,787
Sri Lanka 112 1,998 497 106 234 162 232 294 269 237 309 190 4,640
Vietnam 35 165 117 242 400 403 410 501 262 145 103 170 2,953
No citizenship: 286 1,487 945 814 1,158 789 883 837 385 194 140 178 7,456
Total: 1,256 5,401 3,122 2,708 2,917 2,356 2,833 3,214 2,823 2,312 13,104 5,856 47,902
* From October 1985-December 1985Table A.2 Initial distribution of refugees placed 1986-1997 across counties.
Percent of ethnic group. Part A.
County Copenhagen & Copenhagen Frederiksborg Roskilde West Zealand Storstrøm Bornholm Funen
Frederiksberg
munic.
% of population 11% 12% 7% 4% 6% 5% 1% 9%
Country of origin:
Poland 22.16 9.87 6.41 5.49 3.53 8.17 0.39 8.69
Iraq 20.64 10.51 5.96 5.19 4.01 5.92 0.00 6.06
Iran 13.08 6.91 6.50 3.28 4.91 4.72 0.00 9.42
Vietnam 5.86 4.84 0.51 1.46 1.63 0.17 0.00 27.40
Sri Lanka 2.41 1.38 3.41 0.63 6.44 4.91 0.00 11.96
No citizenship 9.55 4.37 10.26 6.02 10.31 5.90 0.05 8.57
Ethiopia 43.74 10.74 2.39 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.00 4.77
Afghanistan 30.06 21.92 10.54 2.99 9.10 0.60 0.00 0.84
Somalia 14.03 7.48 4.16 0.27 5.44 4.20 0.00 12.00
Rumania 19.00 12.20 2.40 2.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.40
Chile 49.43 8.05 8.05 4.60 0.00 2.30 0.00 9.20
Bosnian-Herz. 7.89 6.50 2.91 1.09 3.99 7.48 1.88 12.97
Serbia-Monte. 9.38 6.25 9.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.38
Croatia 20.21 11.70 7.45 2.66 4.26 8.51 2.13 12.23
Macedonia 56.88 22.68 2.60 1.86 0.37 1.86 0.00 2.60
Slovenia 10.71 25.00 0.00 3.57 0.00 7.14 3.57 17.86
Yugoslavia 11.76 6.27 7.20 1.61 8.86 11.39 2.54 11.13
% of all placed refugees 12.00 6.73 5.26 2.66 5.49 5.59 0.58 11.13
Source: The Refugee Data Set.Table A.2 Initial distribution of refugees placed 1986-97 across counties. Per-
cent of ethnic group. Part B.
County Southern Ribe Vejle Ringkøbing Århus Viborg Northern All (freq.)
Jutland Jutland
% of population 5% 4% 6% 5% 12% 4% 9% 100%
Country of origin:
Poland 2.22 5.56 2.16 2.55 14.64 1.44 6.73 100 (1,530)
Iraq 3.14 5.25 5.35 0.83 13.09 3.12 10.94 100 (4,936)
Iran 2.73 5.11 10.11 2.44 14.96 7.21 7.62 100 (5,787)
Vietnam 2.37 4.74 10.67 1.02 18.22 3.12 18.02 100 (2,953)
Sri Lanka 5.58 5.97 10.32 19.83 10.99 5.71 10.45 100 (4,640)
No citizenship 7.18 3.06 4.97 3.26 11.78 4.39 10.64 100 (7,456)
Ethiopia 11.13 1.19 1.19 0.99 19.09 0.20 3.58 100 (503)
Afghanistan 0.00 0.00 5.75 0.60 12.57 0.24 4.79 100 (835)
Somalia 2.06 7.39 5.57 0.38 19.85 3.53 13.21 100 (4,760)
Rumania 5.80 15.20 1.60 0.60 9.60 14.80 14.80 100 (500)
Chile 0.00 6.90 1.15 0.00 8.05 1.15 1.15 100 (87)
Bosnian-Herz. 4.40 6.32 8.85 6.90 11.46 6.37 10.98 100 (11,467)
Serbia-Monte. 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.75 3.13 31.25 100 (32)
Croatia 3.19 5.32 4.79 2.66 7.45 2.13 5.32 100 (188)
Macedonia 0.37 1.49 3.35 0.37 2.97 0.74 1.86 100 (269)
Slovenia 0.00 14.29 0.00 0.00 10.71 3.57 3.57 100 (28)
Yugoslavia 7.25 2.02 13.52 4.09 5.96 2.90 3.52 100 (1,931)
% of all placed refugees 4.28 5.23 7.73 4.84 13.20 4.84 10.46 100 (47,902)
Source: The Refugee Data Set.Table A.3 Summary statistics for diﬀerent subgroups (initial values). Men.
Part A.
Subgroup All Stayers Movers
Variables Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.)
Age 31.65 (10.78) 33.46 (11.47) 28.85 (8.94)
Married 0.56 (0.50) 0.62 (0.48) 0.45 (0.50)
Marital status change 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18) 0.05 (0.21)
#c h i l d r e n0 - 2y e a r s 0.19 (0.46) 0.20 (0.47) 0.18 (0.45)
# children 3-17 years 0.64 (1.18) 0.72 (1.22) 0.50 (1.10)
Origin:
Poland 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13)
Iraq 0.12 (0.33) 0.11 (0.31) 0.14 (0.35)
Iran 0.13 (0.34) 0.10 (0.30) 0.17 (0.38)
Vietnam 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.18)
Sri Lanka 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.28) 0.12 (0.33)
No citizenship 0.17 (0.37) 0.12 (0.33) 0.23 (0.42)
Ethiopia 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10)
Afghanistan 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13)
Somalia 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.31)
Rumania 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10)
Chile 0.002 (0.04) 0.001 (0.04) 0.002 (0.05)
Bosnia 0.23 (0.42) 0.31 (0.46) 0.11 (0.31)
Serbia 0.001 (0.03) 0.001 (0.03) 0.0001 (0.01)
Croatia 0.004 (0.06) 0.004 (0.07) 0.002 (0.05)
Macedonia 0.004 (0.07) 0.006 (0.08) 0.001 (0.04)
Slovenia 0.001 (0.02) 0.0008 (0.03) 0.0001 (0.01)
Former Yugoslavia 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.23) 0.018 (0.13)
Ethnic stock 8,519 (5,396) 9,783 (5,494) 6,568 (4,605)
Year of immigration:
Immigr. year 1985 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.14) 0.06 (0.23)
Immigr. year 1986 0.16 (0.36) 0.11 (0.31) 0.23 (0.42)
Immigr. year 1987 0.07 (0.25) 0.05 (0.21) 0.09 (0.29)
75Table A.3 Summary statistics for diﬀerent subgroups (initial values). Men.
Part B.
Subgroup All Stayers Movers
Variables Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.)
Immigr. year 1988 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.20) 0.08 (0.27)
Immigr. year 1989 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22) 0.08 (0.27)
Immigr. year 1990 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.22)
Immigr. year 1991 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.21) 0.07 (0.25)
Immigr. year 1992 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24)
Immigr. year 1993 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.23)
Immigr. year 1994 0.04 (0.20) 0.05 (0.21) 0.03 (0.18)
Immigr. year 1995 0.26 (0.44) 0.34 (0.47) 0.15 (0.35)
Immigr. year 1996 0.11 (0.31) 0.15 (0.36) 0.04 (0.20)
Municipality of residence:
Greater Copenhagen area 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38)
Medium-sized 0.56 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.62 (0.49)
Small 0.16 (0.36) 0.13 (0.34) 0.20 (0.40)
%i m m i g r a n t s 5.22 (3.59) 5.78 (3.76) 4.36 (3.11)
% fellow countrymen 0.39 (0.46) 0.44 (0.46) 0.31 (0.44)
Ethnic concentration 4.89 (7.65) 5.69 (8.20) 3.66 (6.52)
Regional unemploym. rate 9.53 (2.29) 9.55 (2.24) 9.51 (2.37)
%o fc o u n t yj o b s 24.71 (26.46) 27.96 (27.11) 19.70 (24.59)
# educ. institutions 8.63 (10.20) 9.96 (10.52) 6.58 (9.34)
% public housing 20.01 (10.77) 21.44 (10.60) 17.81 (10.66)
% right-wing votes 42.53 (13.29) 41.74 (12.82) 43.74 (13.91)
Number of observations 25,674 15,579 10,095
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
76Table A.4 Summary statistics for diﬀerent subgroups (initial values). Women.
Part A.
Subgroup All Stayers Movers
Variables Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.)
Age 32.19 (11.73) 32.87 (12.07) 30.32 (10.49)
Married 0.81 (0.39) 0.82 (0.38) 0.79 (0.41)
Marital status change 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.14) 0.04 (0.20)
#c h i l d r e n0 - 2y e a r s 0.35 (0.55) 0.34 (0.55) 0.37 (0.57)
# children 3-17 years 0.88 (1.30) 0.87 (1.28) 0.90 (1.34)
Origin:
Poland 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.20) 0.07 (0.25)
Iraq 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.30)
Iran 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29) 0.17 (0.38)
Vietnam 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.28) 0.05 (0.23)
Sri Lanka 0.09 (0.10) 0.10 (0.31) 0.07 (0.28)
No citizenship 0.14 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33) 0.20 (0.40)
Ethiopia 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09)
Afghanistan 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13)
Somalia 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.31)
Rumania 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.13)
Chile 0.001 (0.04) 0.002 (0.04) 0.002 (0.05)
Bosnia 0.25 (0.43) 0.28 (0.45) 0.18 (0.36)
Serbia 0.001 (0.025) 0.001 (0.03) 0.0002 (0.01)
Croatia 0.004 (0.07) 0.005 (0.07) 0.003 (0.05)
Macedonia 0.007 (0.08) 0.009 (0.09) 0.002 (0.04)
Slovenia 0.001 (0.025) 0.0009 (0.03) 0 (0.00)
Yugoslavia 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.21) 0.02 (0.14)
Ethnic stock 9,594 (5,062) 10,116 (5,075) 8,161 (4,738)
Year of immigration:
Immigr. year 1985 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.10) 0.03 (0.17)
Immigr. year 1986 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.21) 0.11 (0.31)
Immigr. year 1987 0.07 (0.25) 0.05 (0.22) 0.10 (0.30)
77Table A.4 Summary statistics for diﬀerent subgroups (initial values). Women.
Part B.
Subgroup All Stayers Movers
Variables Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.)
Immigr. year 1988 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 0.08 (0.27)
Immigr. year 1989 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.21) 0.09 (0.29)
Immigr. year 1990 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.26)
Immigr. year 1991 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.08 (0.27)
Immigr. year 1992 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.27)
Immigr. year 1993 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24)
Immigr. year 1994 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 (0.20)
Immigr. year 1995 0.29 (0.45) 0.32 (0.47) 0.19 (0.39)
Immigr. year 1996 0.14 (0.34) 0.17 (0.37) 0.06 (0.23)
Municipality of residence:
Greater Copenhagen area 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40)
Medium-sized 0.56 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49)
Small 0.14 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33) 0.20. (0.49)
%i m m i g r a n t s 5.69 (3.71) 6.04 (3.80) 4.74 (3.27)
%f e l l o wc o u n t r y m e n 0.45 (0.47) 0.47 (0.46) 0.38 (0.50)
Ethnic concentration 5.30 (7.83) 5.83 (8.09) 3.82 (6.85)
Regional unemploym. rate 9.76 (2.32) 9.76 (2.30) 9.77 (2.35)
%o fc o u n t yj o b s 26.00 (27.22) 27.90 (27.29) 20.73 (26.34)
# educ. institutions 9.15 (10.51) 9.93 (10.59) 6.98 (9.98)
% public housing 20.85 (11.04) 27.90 (27.29) 17.85 (10.95)
% right-wing votes 42.23 (13.24) 41.57 (12.73) 44.07 (14.38)
Number of observations 22,228 16,315 5,913
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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